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Abstract
We show strong overall and heterogeneous economic incidence effects, as well as 
distortionary effects, of only shifting statutory incidence (i.e., the agent on which taxes 
are levied), without any tax rate change. For identification, we exploit a tax change and 
administrative data from the credit market: (i) a policy change in 2018 in Spain shifting an 
existing mortgage tax from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks; (ii) some 
areas, for historical reasons, were exempt from paying this tax (or have different tax 
rates); and (iii) an exhaustive matched credit register. We find the following robust results: 
First, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases consistently with a 
strong – but not complete – tax pass-through. Second, there is a large heterogeneity in 
such pass-through: larger for borrowers with lower income, a smaller number of lending 
relationships, not working for the lender, or facing less banks in their zip-code, thereby 
suggesting a bargaining power mechanism at work. Third, despite no variation in the tax 
rate, and consistent with the non-full tax pass-through, the tax shift increases banks’ 
risk-taking. More affected banks reduce costly mortgage insurance in case of loan 
default (especially so if banks have weaker ex-ante balance sheets) and expand into 
non-affected but (much) ex-ante riskier consumer lending, experiencing even higher ex-
post defaults within consumer loans.
Keywords: taxes, incidence, banks, inequality, risk-taking, mortgages.
JEL classification: E51, G21, G28, G51, H22.
Resumen
Este trabajo muestra la fuerte incidencia económica, así como los importantes efectos 
distorsionadores, de cambiar solo el sujeto pasivo de un impuesto (también conocido 
como «cambiar la incidencia estatutaria o legal del impuesto», es decir, un cambio en el 
agente sobre el cual se grava el impuesto) sin que haya ningún cambio en el tipo impositivo. 
Para la identificación usamos un cambio fiscal y datos administrativos del mercado de 
crédito: i) un cambio de política impositiva en 2018 en España, por la cual un impuesto 
hipotecario existente pasó de gravar a los prestatarios a gravar a los bancos; ii) algunas 
regiones, por razones históricas, estaban exentas del pago de este impuesto (o tenían 
diferentes tipos impositivos), y iii) un exhaustivo registro de crédito. El estudio obtiene los 
siguientes resultados: en primer lugar, después del cambio de política impositiva el tipo 
de interés hipotecario promedio aumenta, en coherencia con un alto (pero incompleto) 
traspaso impositivo. En segundo lugar, existe una gran heterogeneidad en dicho traspaso: 
mayor para los prestatarios con ingresos más bajos, con menor número de relaciones 
crediticias, que no trabajan para el prestamista o que tienen menos bancos en su código 
postal. En tercer lugar, a pesar de que no hay variación en el tipo impositivo, el cambio en 
la política impositiva aumenta la asunción de riesgos por los bancos: los más afectados 
reducen los (costosos) seguros hipotecarios en caso de incumplimiento del préstamo 
hipotecario y la responsabilidad hipotecaria (especialmente si los bancos tienen balances 
ex ante más débiles), y también incrementan su probabilidad de conceder préstamos para 
consumo, que no fueron afectados directamente por el cambio en la política impositiva 
pero que son ex ante más arriesgados, y que mostraron mayores incumplimientos ex post.
Palabras clave: impuestos, incidencia, bancos, desigualdad, toma de riesgo, hipotecas.
Códigos JEL: E51, G21, G28, G51, H22.





Taxation – given its impact on the economic decisions of agents – is one of the most studied 
issues in economics. The study of (economic) tax incidence, i.e. which agent bears the economic 
burden of the tax, helps to identify relevant characteristics of markets, such as price elasticities or 
existing frictions, and in doing so can serve as a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis of various 
policy measures (e.g. Chetty, 2009).  
One key tax principle is that tax incidence is independent of which agent taxes are levied on, 
i.e. the irrelevance of statutory or physical incidence (e.g. Kotlikoff and Summers, 1987). Shifting 
the agent on which the tax is levied does not change the economic incidence of the tax, as price 
adjustments compensate such shift.1 However, there are circumstances under which such principle 
can be violated (see e.g. Chetty et al., 2009; Weyl and Fabinger, 2013), and in such cases the 
decision of on which agent taxes are levied on may be of first order. 
In this paper we analyze the overall and heterogeneous effects of only shifting the agent on 
which taxes are levied (i.e., shifting statutory incidence), without any change in tax rates or in any 
other policy. We revisit this key classical question by exploiting a tax shift in the banking industry 
(the credit market) in conjunction with supervisory (administrative) mortgage data.  
While showing effects of a shift in statutory incidence is relevant (as in principle it should not 
matter for tax incidence), focusing on the banking industry, and in mortgages in particular, is also 
interesting. Not only are banks crucial due to their centrality for the economy and their strong moral 
hazard problems (Freixas and Rochet, 2008), but also very similar loans to different borrowers have 
different prices (rates), thereby allowing to identify possible heterogeneous tax incidence through 
different pass-through. Moreover, public debate about introducing taxes to banks due to their role in 
financial crises, e.g. expensive tax-payers’ bailouts or central bank liquidity injections, is also 
salient (e.g. G20 proposal, IMF (2010)). Furthermore, taxes on real estate are also a key source of 
government revenues around the world (Besley, Meads and Surico, 2014; Best and Kleven, 2018) 
and soft lending standards in mortgages were at the core of the 2008 financial crisis (Jaffee et al., 
2009; Freixas, Laeven and Peydró, 2015).  
To study potential tax (economic) incidence and distortionary effects of shifting statutory 
incidence, we exploit: (i) a policy change in Spain in November 2018 that shifts a mortgage tax 
 
1 This principle is sometimes referred to as tax liability side equivalence, “Dalton's Law” (Hugh Dalton, 1922), 
invariance of incidence proposition, or physical neutrality and can be traced to Jenkin (1871-72). The study of tax 
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from being levied on borrowers to being levied on lenders, without any change on the tax rates; (ii) 
the fact that some areas, for historical reasons, are exempt from paying this tax (or have different 
tax rates); and (iii) an exhaustive credit register matched with borrower and lender information.  
We find that, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases consistently with a 
strong – but not complete – tax pass-through, of approximately 80% of the tax base. Importantly, 
we show a very large heterogeneity in the pass-through, which is larger for borrowers with lower 
income, less lending relationships, not working for the lender, or facing a smaller number of banks 
in their zip-code. Our results suggest that unobservable risk is not as a plausible explanation of the 
heterogeneity in the pass-through, given the large quantitative effects that we find and the different 
observed loan interest and default rates across key different borrower variables. Moreover, despite 
there is no change in the tax rate (which could have led to e.g. inefficiencies associated with tax 
increases), and consistent with the non-full pass-through, the tax shift affects key banks’ decisions, 
those related to bank risk-taking. We find that banks more affected by the tax shift (those banks 
with a larger share of their assets affected by the tax shift) exhibit a reduction in their profits and, 
consistently, increase their risk-taking. This extra risk-taking is via a reduction in costly mortgage 
insurance in case of loan default (especially so for weaker banks in terms of higher non-performing 
loans (NPLs)) and an increase of the likelihood of granting applications of non-directly affected but 
(much) ex-ante riskier consumer lending, without changing loan rates differentially but 
experiencing higher ex-post defaults within consumer loans (i.e. spillovers to the riskiest credit).  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that shows economic effects of statutory 
incidence, without a tax rate change (or any other change in policy or tax evasion) but only due to a 
shift of levying a tax from one (to another) set of agents. Specifically, from borrowers to lenders in 
the credit market, or more generally from buyers/consumers to sellers/producers. The tax shift, and 
the banking setting and administrative datasets, allow us identification. Furthermore, as compared 
to Saez et al. (2012) and Kopczuk et al. (2016), our results suggest different mechanisms at work 
and novel results (see in the literature review subsection, the key differences of our study with these 
and other papers). In particular, our findings not only suggest strong overall but also heterogeneous 
economic incidence effects of shifting statutory incidence – affecting more people with lower 
income and those borrowers with less bargaining power with banks – and provide results consistent 
with distortionary effects of shifting statutory incidence in terms of reducing costly bank guarantees 
and increasing the probability of granting non-affected but much riskier lending (especially by more 
affected banks, even more for those with higher ex-ante NPLs, that have a higher likelihood of 
future help from taxpayers and/or central banks, proxying for higher bank moral hazard).  




Overview of the paper. In the rest of this Introduction we provide an overview of the different 
sections of the paper and our contribution to the existing literature.  
In Section 2 we explain the institutional details. On November 10th 2018, the Spanish 
government passed a law determining that a tax for legally documenting new mortgages (Actos 
Jurídicos Documentados) must be levied on banks from that date onwards. Hence, on that date the 
statutory incidence of the tax shifted from borrowers to banks.2 The tax base is the so-called 
mortgage liability, which serves as an insurance for the bank in case of mortgage default (given that 
it is the maximum amount collateralized) and it is one of the features in the mortgage contract. 
Importantly, this tax is administered at the regional level (comunidades autónomas), and ranges 
from 0.5% to 1.5% of the aforementioned mortgage liability, with a region in Spain, the Basque 
Country, with several provinces, where primary residence mortgages are exempt (for historical 
reasons) from such tax. As already explained, tax rates were not altered by the policy change. One 
relevant feature of mortgages in Spain (similarly in Europe) is that they are full-recourse: in case of 
mortgage default, the bank has the right to full repayment of the mortgage obligations, over and 
above the house (collateral), with present and future household wealth and income. Therefore, even 
in the 2008-14 financial crisis in Spain, mortgage defaults and loss given defaults were relatively 
low, see e.g. Bank of Spain’s Financial Stability Report (2017).3 
In Section 3 we explain the datasets. We exploit the exhaustive Spanish credit register (CIR), 
a proprietary database owned by Banco de España (the central bank in Spain) in its role as 
supervisor of the Spanish banking system. This administrative database contains the universe of 
household bank loans granted in Spain by all operating banks on a monthly basis. We observe 
multiple loan characteristics such as the loan rate, loan amount, the mortgage liability, the maturity, 
the zip-code of the borrower and of the real state property, the future credit performance of the loan 
(defaults) as well as the loan-to-value ratio.  
We analyze new household loans granted between January 2018 and May 2019.4 In our main 
analysis we focus on primary residence mortgages as they were (are) exempt from this tax in the 
Basque country and are the majority of mortgages in Spain. We also analyze secondary residence 
 
2 For the law, see https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2018-15344, and for taxes in general in Spain, see 
https://www.agenciatributaria.es/AEAT.internet/en_gb/Inicio/. The legal procedures surrounding the change in the law 
started during October 2018 and are explained in detail in Section 2. It is important to note that this tax is not a tax-
deductible business expense for the bank. 
3 The NPL ratio of mortgages in Spain evolved between a minimum of 1% in 2007 and 6% in 2014, the peak of the 
impact of the Great Recession and the Euro Area Crisis on mortgages. 
4 The policy change took place in November 2018. As we also explain in the main text, in June 2019 there was another 
change in mortgage regulation, so our sample stops in May 2019.  
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mortgages in a robustness exercise. Moreover, we also analyze other household loans (consumer 
credit), which were not subject to the policy change – i.e. spillovers of the policy change on the 
riskiest type of loans (i  terms of defaults). For c sumer credit, we have data on new loan 
application  that ar  not currently borrowing from the requesting bank. We k ow whether a loan 
ap lication is grant d, and for those granted applications, we know loan volumes, rates, maturity 
and defaults. For the mortgage and consumer credit datasets we have borrower-level information 
such as employment status, age, gender, job, leverage and credit history, and a proxy for income via 
the average income in their zip code.5 Finally, we also match the data to supervisory bank balance 
sheets and income statements, e.g., the bank capital ratio, size, NPLs, liquidity ratio, ROA. 
In Section 4 we explain the empirical strategy. As the tax rate depends on which region the 
house is located on, our main empirical strategy consists of a difference-in-difference analysis of 
those mortgages that because of their location are subject to the policy change (treatment group), 
and those mortgages not subject to it (control group). For the control group, we first exploit the 
Basque country where primary residence mortgages were (are) exempt from the tax (i.e., tax rate of 
0%), and then we also exploit loans granted in the areas on the administrative border between the 
control and treatment regions. Having a region in which the tax did not exist in practice, the Basque 
country, allows us to have unaffected zip codes.6 Moreover, we also analyze the change in 
outcomes over a very narrow time window (two weeks), and control in some regressions for many 
lender and borrower observables and unobservables (e.g. different type of borrowers or lenders that 
could be driving the results), as well as loan characteristics, and also check whether those controls 
change the estimated coefficients (following e.g. Oster 2019, and Altonji et al., 2005). We also 
exploit differences in the intensity of treatment as different regions have different tax rates, and 
hence they were differentially affected by the (central/ “federal”) government policy.  
To further understand the channels, we exploit borrower heterogeneities across, e.g., income, 
debt levels and proxies for borrower bargaining power (borrower-lender number of relationships, 
number of banks at the zip code level and working for the lender). Moreover, we also exploit that 
banks could be differentially affected by the policy, as banks differ in their regional exposure, and 
mortgages in treated areas represent a high fraction of their portfolio for some banks. Finally, we 
analyze potential distortions via bank risk-taking in costly mortgage insurance and in the riskiest 
segment of loans (consumer lending), also exploiting lender heterogeneities, not only being 
 
5 We assign the zip code of the household to the zip code of the property associated to the mortgage.  
6 Not only is the tax in one region 0% but the policy shock is relatively small, and hence a difference in difference 
analysis identifies the effects, as a small shock will in principle not generate significant general equilibrium effects. The 
average tax for the median mortgage (which is around 116,000 Euros) accounts for 1,800 Euros. 
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differentially affected by the policy but also measures of the strength of balance sheets that proxy 
for bank moral hazard problems, in particular bank NPLs (see e.g. Freixas and Rochet, 2008). 
In Section 5 we summarize the results (the tables are at the end of the paper). We first proceed 
by analyzing the difference on the average mortgage rate before and after the policy change. We 
find on average a 10 basis-point increase in the yearly total mortgage rates when comparing 
mortgages granted in treated areas with those granted in the control region (the Basque Country). 
The estimated 10 basis points represents 5% of the average mortgage rate. This result is robust to 
introducing various borrower, lender, and location controls as well as a variety of fixed effects. 
Importantly, the estimated coefficient does not change when we saturate the regressions with 
controls and fixed effects. Moreover, despite of losing 99% of the sample, results are identical when 
we analyze the border local areas between the control region and other regions that were affected by 
the reform. We perform various quantitative analyses that suggest that the average 10 basis point 
increase accounts for approximately 80% of the tax, not a complete pass-through (thus not 
consistent with the irrelevance of the statutory incidence).7 Further, results suggest that the banking 
industry adjusts the mortgage rates rapidly, as the majority of the pass-through happens during the 
first two weeks of the tax shift and over the following months there are no further increases in the 
pass-through. We also find very similar estimated effects when the loan interest rate that we analyze 
is the last one in our sample (July 2020), instead of the loan rate at origination. Importantly, there 
are also parallel trends (between the treated and control groups) before the policy shift. Moreover, 
when we perform an intensity of treatment setting exploiting the different tax rates from all regions, 
results give exactly the same 10 basis points already mentioned. 
We also document no change in the observable characteristics of those individuals that were 
granted a mortgage after (versus before) the policy change, which ameliorates the concern of 
endogenous selection by borrowers driving the results.8 Moreover, controlling for borrower and 
loan characteristics increases the R-square by 35 percentage points but keeps the estimated 
coefficient identical, thereby suggesting that unobservables are not driving the results (following 
Altonji et al., 2005; Oster, 2019). To further rule out possible changes in credit conditions as drivers 
 
7 Given data limitations we cannot analyze mortgage fees at the borrower-bank level. Nevertheless, in order to analyze 
potential effects in fees we analyze loan related fees at the bank level and do not find any differential effects of the 
policy on loan related fees across banks more vs. less affected by the policy shift, while we do find differential effects 
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policy, which is consistent with borrowers not changing their decisions regarding mortgages around the policy change. 
Nevertheless, results are very similar if we omit the period just before and just after the tax change (e.g., without the 
months of October and November 2018). 




differentially affected by the policy but also measures of the strength of balance sheets that proxy 
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find on average a 10 basis-point increase in the yearly total mortgage rates when comparing 
mortgages granted in treated areas with those granted in the control region (the Basque Country). 
The estimated 10 basis points represents 5% of the average mortgage rate. This result is robust to 
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Importantly, the estimated coefficient does not change when we saturate the regressions with 
controls and fixed effects. Moreover, despite of losing 99% of the sample, results are identical when 
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of loan rate changes, we find that there is no change in other key characteristics such as the amount 
of the mortgage, the loan to value ratio or the maturity of the mortgage.  
We then document the heterogeneity in the pass-through to mortgage rates and how it 
dep nds o  both borrower (and bank) characteristics. We find a substantial lower pas -through for
b rrowers with high r income, high r amount of banking relationships, higher number of bank
operating in their zip code and those borrowers working for the lender. For instance, households in 
the 75% compared to those in the 25% of the income distribution have 8 basis points less increase 
in the loan interest rates after the policy change. Similarly, households in zip codes with more banks 
(75% versus 25% of the distribution of banks’ presence) have, on average, 2 basis points less
increase in the loan interest rates. There are 7 basis points less increase for households with more 
banking relationships (again 75% versus 25% of the distribution of banking relationships). Further, 
if the borrower works for the lender, there is no pass-through. Given the large quantitative effects 
that we find and the observed loan interest and default rates across different borrower variables, the 
results suggest that unobservable risk is not an explanation of the documented heterogeneity in the 
pass-through.9 For example, borrowers with higher ex-ante number of bank relationships obtain 
lower pass-through on loan rates but default more ex-post.10 Hence, we argue that these large 
heterogeneous effects are an unintended consequence of the tax shift, consistent with higher income 
and, importantly, more bank-connected borrowers having higher bargaining power.  
We argue that the fact that certain borrowers (high income, higher number of banking 
relationships, more banks in the local area, bank employees) experience a much smaller increase in 
their mortgage rates than other borrowers (i.e. weaker pass-through), when the tax is imposed to 
banks instead of to them, is evidence not consistent with statutory incidence being irrelevant for tax 
incidence, and suggest strong distributional effects of statutory incidence. Borrowers with weaker 
(versus stronger) pass-through have lower costs (net of taxes) of obtaining a mortgage after the shift 
 
9 We find that the observed heterogeneity in pass-through between low and high income individuals and those with low 
and high bank relationships would only be consistent with probability of default changing in absolute terms by more 
than 3%. Given this very large increase in defaults rates given the small tax amount, and also given the different sign 
between defaults and loan interest rates for number of relationships (see also next footnote), results suggest that that the 
heterogenous effects we find are not consistent with borrower risk (ex-ante differences in observed loan interest rates 
and default probabilities of mortgages, even historical ones).  
10 We also find that a borrower with a higher number of bank relationships is associated to higher default rates on 
average (for previous research analysing how the number of bank relationships is positively related to borrower risk, see 
Detragiache, Garella and Guiso, 2000). Crucially, we find that these defaults increase after the policy shift for the 
treated (compared to the control) areas, despite that these borrowers obtain lower pass-through on mortgage rates. 
Hence borrower risk cannot explain the results on heterogeneity. For income, we find that higher income households 
have lower pass-through, but there are no differential effects for mortgage defaults after the policy shift for treated as 
compared to control areas (though on average higher income households have lower defaults). For mortgage defaults, 
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We also document no change in the observable characteristics of those individuals that were 
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loan characteristics increases the R-square by 35 percentage points but keeps the estimated 
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7 Given data limitations we cannot analyze mortgage fees at the borrower-bank level. Nevertheless, in order to analyze 
potential effects in fees we analyze loan related fees at the bank level and do not find any differential effects of the 
policy on lo n related fees ac oss banks more vs. less affected by the policy shift, while we do fi  d fferential effect
of (i) loan related interest income (higher for more affected banks, consistent with the main loan level results on pass-
through) and (ii) total bank profits (lower for more affected banks), which suggest that fees are not driving the results. 
8 We also find no relevant aggregate quantity effects regarding the amount or volume of mortgages surrounding the 
policy, which is consistent with borrowers not changing their decisions regarding mortgages around the policy change. 
Nevertheless, results are very similar if we omit the period just before and just after the tax change (e.g., without the 
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if the borrower works for the lender, there is no pass-through. Given the large quantitative effects 
that we find and the observed loan interest and default rates across different borrower variables, the 
results suggest that unobservable risk is not an explanation of the documented heterogeneity in the 
pass-through.9 For example, borrowers with higher ex-ante number of bank relationships obtain 
lower pass-through on loan rates but default more ex-post.10 Hence, we argue that these large 
heterogeneous effects are an unintended consequence of the tax shift, consistent with higher income 
and, importantly, more bank-connected borrowers having higher bargaining power.  
We argue that the fact that certain borrowers (high income, higher number of banking 
relationships, more banks in the local area, bank employees) experience a much smaller increase in 
their mortgage rates than other borrowers (i.e. weaker pass-through), when the tax is imposed to 
banks instead of to them, is evidence not consistent with statutory incidence being irrelevant for tax 
incidence, and suggest strong distributional effects of statutory incidence. Borrowers with weaker 
(versus stronger) pass-through have lower costs (net of taxes) of obtaining a mortgage after the shift 
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and high bank relationships would only be consistent with probability of default changing in absolute terms by more 
than 3%. Given this very large increase in defaults rates given the small tax amount, and also given the different sign 
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heterogenous effects we find are not consistent with borrower risk (ex-ante differences in observed loan interest rates 
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in policy and, given that we do not find any other changes in mortgage characteristics (LTV, 
maturity, volume), the results suggest that borrowers with weaker pass-through increase their 
relative welfare as they obtain the same mortgage at a lower total cost relative to the borrowers with 
higher pass-through (e.g. lower income orrowers or with less number of lenders). For evidence not 
consistent with statutory incid nce being irrelevant for tax incidence, note that these large 
heterogeneous effects are in addition t  the strong but not complete pass-through t  loan rates (that 
we d scribed before) a d to the distortionary effects t at w  will discuss below.11 
Once the results suggest strong economic incidence of only shifting statutory incidence 
(without any tax rate change), we analyze whether the tax shift causes distortions in banks’ risk-
taking decisions. If banks do not fully pass-through the cost of the tax to borrowers (see the above 
results), the policy change m y reduce bank revenues, thereby potentially increasing banks’ risk- 
taking incent ves (e.g. Keeley, 1990, Holmström and Ti ole, 1997; Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 
2000; Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Freixas, Laeven and Peydró, 2015).  
We first document that those banks more affected by the tax shift (i.e. those banks with a 
higher proportion of their assets as mortgages in regions affected by the tax shift) exhibit a higher 
increase in their loan interest rate income (consistent with our loan-level results documenting a 
positive pass-through to mortgage rates), no differential effects on loan fees, and suffer a higher 
relative decrease in their profitability (ROA).  
Consistent with the non-full pass-through, and hence with a reduction in bank profitability, 
we find that banks more affected by the policy increase risk-taking by changing their mortgage and 
non-mortgage lending strategies. We find that, after the tax shift, more affected banks reduce more 
the costly mortgage liability (i.e. an insurance in case of mortgage default) and increase the 
probability of granting applications to non-directly affected (but much riskier) consumer loans.12 
The amount set as mortgage liability serves as the collateral of the mortgage, i.e. it is the maximum 
amount that the bank can directly appropriate from selling the house in case of the mortgage 
defaulting. Hence, the tax shift induces banks to increase their risk as they become more exposed to 
loses (lower recoveries) in case of mortgage defaults, and also as they grant more consumer loans, 
which are substantially riskier than mortgages (e.g. higher default probability and higher loss given 
 
11 We also document that some bank characteristics are key for the pass-through. The increase is higher the higher the 
capital to asset ratio of the bank, which is consistent with equity being the more expensive source of financing for the 
banks (Freixas and Rochet, 2008) and hence the shift being more costly for those banks. The increase is also higher for 
banks with higher ratio of household loans to total assets (consistent with these banks being more specialized in 
mortgages), and for banks with higher NPLs, consistent with higher costs of funding due to higher provisioning. 
12 For example, loan rates for consumer loans are 9% in our sample period as compared to only 2% for mortgages 
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default as consumer loans are generally non-collateralized). This increase in bank risk-taking is 
probably an unintended consequence of the tax shift (note also that banks are generally bailed-out in 
c se of strong istress and receiv  generous c tral bank iquidity injections), th reby highli hting
the relevance of statutory incidence in affecti g banks’ risk-taking. 
In particular, regarding the mortgage liability, we find that the reduction in mortgage liability 
after the tax shift is not only higher for more affected banks, but it is also higher for those 
mortgag s in treated areas. Interestingly, we find that the reducti n in mortgage li bility is stronger 
for more affected banks with weaker ex-ante balance shee , in terms of higher NPLs, which can 
proxy for those banks having larger moral hazard problems (see Freixas and Rochet, 2008). We also 
find that the reduction in mortgage liability is unrelated to observable characteristics of individuals 
(which, see the above results, are key drivers of pass-through to mortgage rates).13  
Regarding non-affected household loans (i.e., consumer loans), we find that the probability of 
granting a consumer loan application after the tax shift is higher for more affected banks (with 
higher ex-ante mortgage volume in treated areas) and is also higher in treated areas.14 We also find 
that there is no change in the conditions of granted consumer loans (loan rate, maturity or loan 
amount) but, after the policy change, there is an increase in the ex-post default rate of granted 
consumer loans in treated areas. This finding is consistent with a relaxation of the lending standards 
on consumer loans associated to the shifting of the mortgage statutory incidence, i.e. higher risk-
taking via higher ex-ante risk, without changing loan rates, and with higher ex-post defaults. 
Related literature. Our main contribution is to the literature analyzing the implications of tax 
interventions in markets in general. As previously argued, the literature analyzing tax incidence and 
how taxes affect economic decisions is ample, e.g. Kotlikoff and Summers (1987) and Fullerton and 
Metcalf (2002) provide comprehensive reviews of the literature. The novelty of our study relies on 
its focus in one important aspect of taxation – statutory incidence – rarely analyzed empirically, as 
tax changes are normally associated to changes in tax rates, not just purely shifts in the agents on 
which taxes are levied. Moreover, we empirically analyze statutory incidence in one crucial market 
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default as consumer loans are generally non-collateralized). This increase in bank risk-taking is 
probably an unintended consequence of the tax shift (note also that banks are generally bailed-out in 
case of strong distress and receive generous central bank liquidity injections), thereby highlighting 
the relevance of statutory incidence in affecting banks’ risk-taking. 
In particular, regarding the mortgage liability, we find that the reduction in mortgage liability 
after the tax shift is not only higher for more affected banks, but it is also higher for those 
mortgages in treated areas. Interestingly, we find that the reduction in mortgage liability is stronger 
for more affected banks with weaker ex-ante balance sheets, in terms of higher NPLs, which can 
proxy for those banks having larger moral hazard problems (see Freixas and Rochet, 2008). We also 
find that the reduction in mortgage liability is unrelated to observable characteristics of individuals 
(which, see the above results, are key drivers of pass-through to mortgage rates).13  
Regarding non-affected household loans (i.e., consumer loans), we find that the probability of 
granting a consumer loan application after the tax shift is higher for more affected banks (with 
higher ex-ante mortgage volume in treated areas) and is also higher in treated areas.14 We also find 
that there is no change in the conditions of granted consumer loans (loan rate, maturity or loan 
amount) but, after the policy change, there is an increase in the ex-post default rate of granted 
consumer loans in treated areas. This finding is consistent with a relaxation of the lending standards 
on consumer loans associated to the shifting of the mortgage statutory incidence, i.e. higher risk-
taking via higher ex-ante risk, without changing loan rates, and with higher ex-post defaults. 
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Our paper is related to those studies analyzing how different tax characteristics determine its 
incidence. Chetty et al. (2009) shows the relevance of saliency for tax incidence. Saez et al. (2012) 
finds that, after an overall reform in payroll taxes in Greece, employers compensate for the extra 
employer payroll taxes but not for the extra employee payroll taxes. They argue that their results 
suggest that the mechanism at work is the nability of employers to pay similar workers differently 
when they are subject to different taxes, related to pay fairness norms and wage rigidities inside the 
firm. Kopczuk et al. (2016) shows the relevance of tax evasion capacity (technology) – the 
mechanism at ork – of the producer on which taxes are levied for tax incid nce in the diesel 
ind stry. By having different evas on capaciti s, the “effective” tax rate that different producers 
face (once they undergo tax evasion) is different, which in turn affects the incidence of the tax. In 
comparison to these studies, we analyze a policy change exploiting only a shift in statutory 
incidence – without a change in the tax rate (or even the “effective” tax rate due to tax evasion), or 
any other related policy – which significantly improves the empirical identification of (i.e., isolates) 
statutory incidence. Moreover, our results suggest different mechanisms at work and provide novel 
results. Our results show not only strong overall effects but also large heterogeneous effects on 
borrowers – on different household income and different borrower-bank connections, which are 
proxies for borrowers’ bargaining power – not consistent with the irrelevance of the statutory 
incidence (shift). Moreover, by analyzing banks and credit, and given that there is not a full pass-
through, our results further suggest distortionary effects due to the change in statutory incidence: 
More affected banks by the policy, and even more those with higher moral hazard problems 
(proxied by ex-ante riskier assets, higher ex-ante NPLs), take substantial higher risk after the policy 
change. They do so by reducing costly mortgage insurance, and by having a higher likelihood of 
granting applications in the ex-ante riskiest type of loans (consumer credit), experiencing even 
higher ex-post defaults within consumer loans (despite of no change in ex-ante loan rates). 
Our analysis on mortgage taxes relates to those papers analyzing the incidence of transaction 
taxes in housing markets. Best and Kleven (2018) and Besley et al. (2014) study the effects of 
introducing stamp duty holidays in the UK. Crucially, our analysis differs from these previous 
studies as we analyze a change in statutory incidence without changing the tax rate (as a stamp duty 
holiday implies) and find important effects associated with only shifting statutory incidence. 
Moreover, our findings on banks and credit also relate to a large literature analyzing the economic 
consequences of distortions in credit markets (see e.g. Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Chodorow-Reich, 
2014). Our results on how changes in market conditions affect banks’ risk-taking relates to various 
studies analyzing the determinants of bank risk-taking decisions. Previous research has shown how 
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banks’ risk-taking can be shaped by various policy measures: e.g. capital requirements (Hellman et 
al., 2000), competition (Keeley, 1990) or monetary policy interventions (Jiménez et al., 2014), and 
how, in line with our findings, targeted interventions in a given market can have (unintended) 
spillover effects on other markets (Chakraborty et al., 2019). Our main contribution to this literature 
is to show how statutory incidence generates relevant effects for banks, resulting in higher risk-
taking, and for borrowers, given the heterogeneous pass-through to different type of households.  
In Section 2 we discuss the institutional details. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 
explains the empirical strategy. In Section 5 we summarize the results of the paper. Finally, Section 
6 briefly presents some concluding remarks. 
2. Institutional details 
Mortgages in Spain are subject to an administrative tax that has to be paid upon the 
formalization of the mortgage (Actos Juridicos Documentados). This tax accounts for 1.5% of the 
mortgage value on average and is based on the so-called mortgage liability (responsibilidad 
hipotecaria). Mortgage liability is based on the value of the mortgage at inception and its main role 
is to determine the maximum amount that the lender can directly appropriate by selling the house in 
the case of mortgage default, i.e. the collateral amount of the mortgage. Hence, the mortgage 
liability can be seen as a costly insurance for banks: costly because of the tax, and insurance 
because of the collateral.  
This tax is administered at the regional level (comunidades autónomas), and ranges from 
0.5% to 1.5% of the aforementioned mortgage liability.15 Interestingly, a region in Spain, the 
Basque Country, has primary residence mortgages exempt from such tax. The underlying reason 
from such exemption is that, for historical reasons, the Basque Country has a special tax system 
different from the other regions in Spain.16    
Originally the tax was levied on the households who borrow via a mortgage, i.e. statutory 
incidence fell on borrowers. On the 18th October 2018, the Supreme Court in Spain stated a new 
 
15 Table 3 in the Appendix provides details on the exact base tax rate in each region. The exact tax rate depending on 
whether the mortgage is for primary residence, or the age of the borrower. To reduce this dispersion, only primary 
residential mortgages are considered in the main analysis and the age of the borrower is included as a control. In Spain, 
the mortgage liability of the average mortgage is around 1.5 times the amount of the loan. 
16 In Spain (similarly in Europe), mortgages are full-recourse. That is, in case of loan default, the bank has the right to 
full repayment of the mortgage obligations over and above the house with present and future household wealth and 
income (over and above some minimum income that goes directly to the household). Therefore, even in the 2008-14 
strong financial crisis, mortgage defaults and loss given defaults were relatively low, see e.g. Bank of Spain’s Financial 
Stability Report (2017). In particular, in 2014 mortgage NPLs reached their peak at 6% and LGD was (approximately) 
16%. Mortgage volume over GDP was around 50%. The defaults during the long crisis were to firms, mainly related to 
real estate (based on NPLs and LGDs), but not to households (Freixas, Laeven and Peydró, 2015).  
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mandate by which the agent that should pay the tax was the bank. However the mandate was not 
effective as one day later, on the 19th of October 2018, it was put on hold given the “important 
economic and social impact” of t  issue. On the 6th of November 2018 the ecision of the Court 
was to maintain the o iginal mandate in which the t x was levied o  ho seholds. On t  8th of
November 2018 a new la  by the central government – a Royal Decree – was approved declaring 
that the tax has to be paid by the banks granting the mortgage (Real Decreto-ley 17/2018) from that 
moment onwards. Such law started to be effective on the 10th of November 2018, shifting statutory 
incidence to lenders.  
In short, on the 10th of November 2018 the tax shifted from being levied on households to 
being levied on banks – i.e., from borrowers (credit demand)/consumers to lenders (credit 
suppliers)/ producers. Given the timing of the rulings, there may be some anticipation effects being 
alread  present during October 2018.18 Importantly, as tax rat s were not altered by the policy
change, there was only a change in statutory or physical incidence. In addition, these taxes are not a 
tax deductible expense for banks.  
Another relevant development regarding the mortgage market in Spain is that on the 16th of 
March 2019 the Spanish government passed a new law (Ley 5/2019) regulating various aspects of 
mortgages in Spain, which would take effect three months later (this new law in great part was to 
transpose into the Spanish legislation the European directive 2014/17/UE). This suggests that after 
(or on) June 2019 there are other relevant developments in the mortgage market that could 
confound our results. For this reason, and also in order to have a balanced number of periods before 
and after the main policy change, we start our analysis on January 2018 and end it on May 2019. 
Moreover, we show the estimated effects for the main regression for every month in our sample 
data to check for pre-trends; potential anticipation effects; how fast changes (pass-through) in loan 
prices occur; and finally, whether there are effects after March 2019 given the announcement of a 
new law that becomes effective on June 2019. Moreover, for robustness, we also analyze the last 
available loan rate (July 2020), instead of loan rates at origination, to check whether results are 
significant even two years after the policy shift, given the potential change in loan rates over the life 
of the loan.  
The amount of new residential mortgages in Spain in 2018 was 43,284 million euros. The 
main lenders of residential mortgages in Spain are banks which represent above 98% of the total 
 
18 Figures 2, 3 and Figure 4 in Appendix show how anticipatory effects were either inexistent or small. We also perform 
robustness analysis excluding October and November 2018, in order to eliminate possible anticipation effects, and find 




banks’ risk-taking can be shaped by various policy measures: e.g. capital requirements (Hellman et 
al., 2000), competition (Keeley, 1990) or monetary policy interventions (Jiménez et al., 2014), and 
how, in line with our findings, targeted interventions in a given market can have (unintended) 
spillover effects on other markets (Chakraborty et al., 2019). Our main contribution to this literature 
is to show how statutory incidence generates relevant effects for banks, resulting in higher risk-
taking, and for borrowers, given the heterogeneous pass-through to different type of households.  
In Section 2 we discuss the institutional details. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 
explains the empirical strategy. In Section 5 we summarize the results of the paper. Finally, Section 
6 briefly presents some concluding remarks. 
2. Institutional details 
Mortgages in Spain are subject to an administrative tax that has to be paid upon the 
formalization of the mortgage (Actos Juridicos Documentados). This tax accounts for 1.5% of the 
mortgage value on average and is based on the o-called mortgage liability (responsibilidad 
hi otecaria). Mortgage li bility is based on th  value of the mortgage at ince tion and its main role 
is to determine the maximum amount that the lender can directly appropriate by selling the house in 
the case of mortgage default, i.e. the collateral amount of the mortgage. Hence, the mortgage 
liability can be seen as a costly insurance for banks: costly because of the tax, and insurance 
because f the collateral.  
This tax is administered at the regional level (comunidades autónomas), and ranges from 
0.5% to 1.5% of the aforementioned mortgage liability.15 Interestingly, a region in Spain, the 
Basque Country, has primary residence mortgages exempt from such tax. The underlying reason 
from such exemption is that, for historical reasons, the Basque Country has a special tax system 
different from the other regions in Spain.16    
Originally the tax was levied on the households who borrow via a mortgage, i.e. statutory 
incidence fell on borrowers. On the 18th October 2018, the Supreme Court in Spain stated a new 
 
15 Table 3 in the Appendix provides details on the exact base tax rate in each region. The exact tax rate depending n
whether the mortgage is for primary residence, or the age of the borrower. To reduce this dispersion, only primary 
residential mortgages are considered in the main analysis and the age of the borrower is included as a control. In Spain, 
the ortgage liability of the aver ge mortgage is around 1.5 times the amount of the loan. 
16 In Spain (similarly in Europe), mortgages are full-recourse. That is, in case of loan default, the bank has the right to 
full repayment of the mortgage bligations over and above the house with present and future household wealth and 
income (over and above some minimum income that goes directly to the household). Therefore, even in the 2008-14 
strong financial crisis, mortgage defaults and loss given defaults were relatively low, see e.g. Bank of Spain’s Financial 
Stability Report (2017). In particular, in 2014 mortgage NPLs reached their peak at 6% and LGD was (approximately) 
16%. Mortgage volume over GDP was around 50%. The defaults durin  the long crisis were to firms, mainly related to
real estate (based on NPLs and LGDs), but not to households (Freixas, Laeven and Peydró, 2015).  




mandate by which the agent that should pay the tax was the bank. However the mandate was not 
effective as one day later, on the 19th of October 2018, it was put on hold given the “important 
economic and social impact” of the issue. On the 6th of November 2018 the decision of the Court 
was to maintain the original mandate in which the tax was levied on households. On the 8th of 
November 2018 a new law by the central government – a Royal Decree – was approved declaring 
that the tax has to be paid by the banks granting the mortgage (Real Decreto-ley 17/2018) from that 
moment onwards. Such law started to be effective on the 10th of November 2018, shifting statutory 
incidence to lenders.  
In short, on the 10th of November 2018 the tax shifted from being levied on households to 
being levied on banks – i.e., from borrowers (credit demand)/consumers to lenders (credit 
suppliers)/ producers. Given the timing of the rulings, there may be some anticipation effects being 
already present during October 2018.18 Importantly, as tax rates were not altered by the policy 
change, there was only a change in statutory or physical incidence. In addition, these taxes are not a 
tax deductible expense for banks.  
Another relevant development regarding the mortgage market in Spain is that on the 16th of 
March 2019 the Spanish government passed a new law (Ley 5/2019) regulating various aspects of 
mortgages in Spain, which would take effect three months later (this new law in great part was to 
transpose into the Spanish legislation the European directive 2014/17/UE). This suggests that after 
(or on) June 2019 there are other relevant developments in the mortgage market that could 
confound our results. For this reason, and also in order to have a balanced number of periods before 
and after the main policy change, we start our analysis on January 2018 and end it on May 2019. 
Moreover, we show the estimated effects for the main regression for every month in our sample 
data to check for pre-trends; potential anticipation effects; how fast changes (pass-through) in loan 
prices occur; and finally, whether there are effects after March 2019 given the announcement of a 
new law that becomes effective on June 2019. Moreover, for robustness, we also analyze the last 
available loan rate (July 2020), instead of loan rates at origination, to check whether results are 
significant even two years after the policy shift, given the potential change in loan rates over the life 
of the loan.  
The amount of new residential mortgages in Spain in 2018 was 43,284 million euros. The 
main lenders of residential mortgages in Spain are banks which represent above 98% of the total 
 
18 Figures 2, 3 and Figure 4 in Appendix show how anticipatory effects were either inexistent or small. We also perform 
robustness analysis excluding October and November 2018, in order to eliminate possible anticipation effects, and find 




mandate by which the agent that should pay the tax was the bank. However the mandate was not 
effective as one day later, on the 19th of October 2018, it was put on hold given the “important 
economic and social impact” of the issue. On the 6th of November 2018 the decision of the Court 
was to maintain the original mandate in which the tax was levied on households. On the 8th of 
November 2018 a new law by the central government – a Royal Decree – was approved declaring 
that the tax has to be paid by the banks granting the mortgage (Real Decreto-ley 17/2018) from that 
moment onwards. Such law started to be effective on the 10th of November 2018, shifting statutory 
incidence to lenders.  
In short, on the 10th of November 2018 the tax shifted from being levied on households to 
being levied on banks – i.e., from borr wers (credit demand)/ onsumers to lenders (credit 
suppliers)/ producers. Given the timing of the rulings, there may be some anticipation effects being 
already present during October 2018.18 Importantly, as tax rates w re not altered by the polic  
change, there was only a change in statutory or physical incidence. In addition, these taxes are not a 
tax deductible expense for banks.  
Another relevant development regarding the mortgage arket in Spain is that on the 16th of 
March 2019 the Spanish government passed a new law (Ley 5/2019) regulating various aspects of 
mortgages in Spain, which would take effect three months later (this new law in great part was to 
transpose into the Spanish legislation the European directive 2014/17/UE). This suggests that after 
(or on) June 2019 there are other relevant developments in the mortgage market that could 
confound our results. For this reason, and also in order to have a balanced number of periods before 
and after the main policy change, we start our analysis on January 2018 and end it on May 2019. 
Moreover, we show the estimated effects for the main regression for every month in our sample 
data to check for pre-trends; potential anticipation effects; how fast changes (pass-through) in loan 
prices occur; and finally, whether there are effects after March 2019 given the announcement of a 
new law that becomes effective on June 2019. Moreover, for robustness, we also analyze the last 
available loan rate (July 2020), instead of loan rates at origination, to check whether results are 
significant even two years after the policy shift, given the potential change in loan rates over the life 
of the loan.  
The amount of new resid ntial mortgages in Spain in 2018 was 43,284 millio  uros. The 
main lenders of residential mortgages in Spain are banks which represent above 98% of the total 
 
18 Figures 2, 3 and Figure 4 in Appendix show how anticipatory effects were either inexistent or small. We also perform 
robustness analysis excluding October and November 2018, in order to eliminate possible anticipation effects, and find 




volume of mo tgages.19 Fixed (variable) rate mortgages in Spain represent 37% (63%) of new 
residential mortgages in 2018. The vast majority of variable rate mort ages (more than 99%) that 
were granted in 2018 wer r ferenced  the Euribor (which was raising over our sample period, see 
Figure 1). Further, different from the US, there is no securitization to public agencies (such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Ma) and the private market of securitization is very small (Jiménez et al. 
2020). Moreover, a key feature of mortgages in Spain (similar to other European countries and 
some US states) is their full recourse nature. In case of mortgage default, the mortgage liability 
serves as the collateralized amount of the mortgage, and if proce ds of selling the house re not 
enough to fulfill the debt obligations, the debtor is still liable with present and future income and 
wealth. In such cases, while the debtor is still liable for the non-repaid part of the mortgage, there 
are various rules about a minimum amount of the borrower’s income that cannot be seized in order 
to fulfill the debt obligation.  
3. Datasets 
In our study we combine three (matched) administrative datasets: (i) the Spanish Credit 
Register with information on loan level data on the universe of mortgages, including borrower 
(household) and lender (banks) characteristics; (ii) supervisory bank balance sheet information; and 
(iii) loan application data for consumer loans.  
We exploit the Spanish Credit Register (CIR), a confidential loan-level database that contains 
all loans granted in Spain by any bank operating in the country since 1984 at a monthly frequency.20 
For the purpose of the paper we analyze loans to households and, in particular, on all primary 
residence mortgages granted (in this case we have a region with 0% tax rate, unaffected) between 
January 1, 2018 and May 31, 2019. However, we also analyze: (i) secondary residence mortgages: 
statutory incidence also changed for these mortgages, and also there was no tax change rate in these 
mortgages, but all tax rates are positive for these mortgages though with different tax rates; and (ii) 
consumer lending: (directly) not affected by the change in the tax law, but with potential spillovers 
as loans to households are divided between mortgages and consumer lending. 
Importantly, in 2016 the CIR was modified to, among other changes, reduce its reporting 
threshold from 6,000 euros to 0 euros, i.e. we have the universe of loans. The CIR improvement 
 
19 Different from US, where a key segment of lenders is fintech, in Spain fintech activity is very small, and they are 
concentrated on payments and firms. 
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also affected the information reported on borrowers and loan conditions. In addition to the usual 
information about loan characteristics provided by the previous CIR (such as the type of instrument, 
currency, d gr e of collateralization, def ult status, the amount grante  and the borrower 
nationality), many other characteristics of the loan were included or improved such as the loan 
interest rate (amount and type), the exact maturity, the mortgage liability, the loan to value ratio 
(LTV), defaults and the zip code of the property among others. Moreover, since 2016 the CIR also 
began to store information of the borrower such as her employment status (unemployed, public 
servant, student, banking group employee…), age and gender. We exploit all this information along 
with her credit history. Moreover, as we do not have borrower-level income, we proxy the gross 
income of the household with information at the zip code level. We use the average gross income of 
the households at the zip code level in 2016 (which is the last available year) provided by the
Spanish Statistical Office (INE), where the the number of zip codes in our analysis is 11,752 (the 
population is just below 47 million people). We also proxy borrowers’ bargaining power by 
including the number of banks granting loans in the zip code where the house is located and also the 
number of banking relationships that the borrower has as of December 2017. 
For our main regressions, we focus on newly originated primary residence mortgages, 
excluding from our sample those households who have a self-employed worker among their 
members. We exclude self-employed workers as these workers sometimes use their residences as 
their workplace and we do not have their firm related information, which is very relevant. 
Moreover, we do not include renovations or refinancing of mortgages, given the special 
characteristics of these type of operations.21 As a robustness, we also consider secondary residence 
mortgages despite that for this type of mortgages tax rates were positive in all regions (the Basque 
Country only exempts primary mortgages).  
As well as newly granted mortgages, in Section 5.2.2 we also analyze newly granted 
consumer loans. In particular, we also exploit a new dataset of consumer loan applications during 
the same time period. This database contains information of loan applications made by borrowers 
without current relationships with the lender. Once this information is merged with the CIR, it is 
possible to know whether the loan application was finally accepted by the bank and granted. For a 
more detailed description of the CIR see, for instance, Jiménez et al. (2012, 2014, 2017). We also 
have loan-level information on loan rates, volumes, maturity, and defaults. Importantly, consumer 
 
21 Primary residence mortgages are the main share of mortgages in Spain. Renovations and refinancing represent less 
than 20% of the mortgage market in Spain during 2018 (www.ine.es). In particular, renovations and refinancing 
operations with just a change in loan rate and/or maturity do not have to pay the mortgage tax again (law 41/2007) and, 
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loans were not (directly) affected by the policy change and are substantially riskier than mortgages. 
Consume  loa s exhibit much higher default probabil ties a d are gener lly uncollateralized, and 
consistently they have substanti lly higher loan rates t n mortgages (see also Table 1).  
Finally, we use the balance sheets and income statements of banks as of 31st December of 
2017 (when our sample starts). The Bank of Spain, in its role of supervisor, periodically receives 
detailed information of bank’s balance sheet and profit and loss accounts. In this paper, we consider 
the log of total assets as a proxy of the size of the bank, the capital ratio as the ratio of owns funds 
over total assets, the ratio of liquid assets over total assets, the return on assets (ROA) for total bank 
profitability, the NPL (non-performing loan) ratio capturing the risk profile of the bank and the 
household credit volume over total assets as a measure of the bank portfolio specialization on 
mortg ges. W  also include some other borrower-bank variables to capture the strength of the 
relationship such as whether the bank was the main lender of the household as of December 2017, 
whether the bank was the leader bank (highest mortgage market share) in the zip code, or how much 
mortgage exposure the bank has in the most affected areas. We also include the number of banks in 
every zip code to proxy for bank competition and the number of bank relationships a borrower has. 
4. Empirical Identification 
We start by analyzing the impact on loan interest rates of newly originated mortgages of 
shifting the statutory incidence of the mortgage tax. For economic tax incidence, we analyze overall 
pass-through as well as heterogeneous effects. We then analyze bank risk-taking by more affected 
banks and in more affected areas, in particular costly insurance (mortgage liability) and consumer 
lending (i.e., lending to households not affected by the change in the tax law). 
As explained in detail in the previous sections, on November 10, 2018, a Royal Decree 
(policy change) entered into force changing the taxpayer of the tax from the borrower to the bank, a 
shift in the statutory incidence, with heterogeneity across regions (in Spain this tax is transferred to 
the regions), and without a change in the tax rate (just a change on whom the tax is levied on). As 
there is no other policy event (such as a change in the tax rate or an overall reform) and the context 
is not one on (changing) tax evasion, but only shifting the statutory incidence, the setting (policy 
change and administrative data) significantly improves the empirical identification of (i.e., isolates) 
statutory incidence.  
The territorial idiosyncrasies of Spain help with the identification strategy, as the Basque 
Country has its own tax regime, which means that the Royal Decree has no effect on this 
jurisdiction and different regions have different tax rates. Importantly, given that the Basque 
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Country has a tax rate of 0% before and after the introduction of the law for the primary residence
mortgages, we use a difference-in-differences specification to fit the quasi-experiment that arises 
after the modification of the law, where the control (unaffected) areas were the locations in the 
Basque Country and the treated areas the ones outside this region. As explained below, we also 
exploit zip codes around the border of the Basque Country and other regions (despite a reduction in 
99% of the sample), as well as we also analyze all the regions via differential intensity in treatment, 
as tax rates vary across regions from 0% to 1.5% (there are 19 regions in Spain, including two 
autonomous cities; 50 provinces and 2 autonomous cities; and the number of zip codes in our 
analysis is 11,752). 
We construct a treatment variable as the product of the dummies Post and Treated, where 
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Country (see Table A3). Results are the same if we exclude mortgages from Navarra.  
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primary residence for the household (i.e. there is no repeating borrower over the household before 
and after, and there is generally one house purchase and hence one loan per household). Our set of 
household controls include a set of dummies depending on the specification we use: zip 
code*employment status and zip code*employment status*foreign, where zip code captures average 
household income and wealth, and employment status distinguishes between public servant, bank 
group employee (of the lender), student and unemployment, homeworker or rest of employees, and 
foreign is a dummy capturing whether the head of the family is a resident but with foreign 
nationality. The set of household controls also includes, in some specifications, other observable 
household characteristics such as her credit history and number of banking relationships. Moreover, 
we control in some regressions for other loan characteristics such as the maturity or the amount 
granted or mortgage liability to check the stability of the estimated coefficients.  
The bank-time (ηjt) fixed effects control for observable and unobservable time-variant bank 
factors. In the most stringent sp cification we interact thi  set of b nk-time effects with the type of 
mortgage loan (fix or variable rate). The inclusion of the type of mortgage loan by the time when 
the loan was granted by each bank has the advantage of homogenizing all mortgages and allow us 
to better compare loan rates. Standard errors are triple-clustered at the bank, time, and zip code 
level to allow for serial correlation across mortgages of the same bank and those granted in the 
same period or in the same zip code over time.23 
The coefficient β on the product of Treated*Post captures the impact on loan interest rates of 
the Royal Decree after its introduction in the regions where it applies with respect to the control 
group. We will analyze both the overall effects of the tax change, and also heterogeneous effects 
across difference household variables such as household income and borrower-bank connections. 
To test for heterogeneous effects in our variable of interest, we estimate the analogous of Eq. (1) 
including an additional interaction term. The equation takes the form: 
,     (2) 
where, is a vector of household or household-bank (or bank) characteristics.  
Additionally, to estimate the effects on other relevant mortgage related variables (such as 
maturity, loan to value ratio, loan amount or loan amount/mortgage liability, defaults) we replace 
the left-hand side variable of the above equations by each of the aforementioned loan variables. For 
 
23 As robustness, we have also clustered the standard errors at regional level instead of at zip code level using the wild 
cluster bootstrap, and the estimated coefficients are still significant. Effects are also significant with region*pre/post 
clustering. 
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consumer loans, we also study the likelihood of granting a loan application and loan outcomes such 
as loan volume, rates, maturity and defaults.  
There are regional differences as the Basque Country is one of the richest regions in Spain. 
Regarding possible differences in observables between the treatment and control groups, columns 1 
to 3 of Table A1 in the Online Appendix (at the end of the paper) illustrates the differences of 
mortgage loans between those granted in the Basque Country and outside. It shows, for some 
household, bank and loan observed characteristics, the average differences by treatment and control 
group. For comparison among groups, we use the Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) statistic, which 
avoids the sample-size dependence on the mean test by computing the difference of the means of 
each variable for the two groups normalized by the square root of the sum of the variances of the 
variables. Its absolute value is compared with 0.25, a heuristic value proposed by Imbens and Rubin 
(2015) to test whether the differences should be considered significant or not. As expected, the 
gross income of the households in the Basque Country seems to be larger (10.42 vs. 10.28), which 
is in line with the fact that the loan amount is higher and the interest rate lower (11.68 vs. 11.45 and 
1.57 vs. 2.10, respectively). Moreover, the average bank that grants mortgages to households in the 
treatment group is bigger and riskier. This evidence highlights the importance of controlling for 
income proxies of the household and for bank factors, either through fixed effects or with observed 
characteristics.  
The last three columns of Table 1 provide the same comparison but restricting the sample to 
the mortgage loans granted in the zip codes adjacent to the border of (both outside and within) the 
Basque Country. The observed differences diminish, making the two groups more similar. For 
example, for household characteristics only the number of banks per household is significantly 
different. Nevertheless, in addition to controlling for different characteristics (observables and then 
unobservables through fixed effects), we will also test selection on further unobservables following 
Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2019), see the results section: e.g. the R-squared increases by 35 
percentage points and the estimated coefficient slightly increases in absolute value but not different 
statistically, thereby suggesting significant results even if we could control for further 
unobservables. Moreover, the estimated effect is identical in the sample with all loans (with all 
regions) and in the restricted sample with loans only to areas in the border of the Basque Country, 
despite we lose 99% of observations. 
In addition, we also test whether before versus after the policy shift there are differences in 
the observed variables. No household, loan or bank variable has a normalized difference higher than 
0.25. The variable with the higher difference is loan rates (with an absolute normalized value 
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equaled to 0.16), which is consistent with higher loan rates after the tax law in the treated areas (i.e., 
the pass-through). Therefore, results do not suggest a shift in the composition of household 
(demand characteristics) or bank (supply characteristics) for mortgages following the change in the 
Royal Decree. At this point it is important to recall that the tax represents less than 1% of the total 
cost of buying a house. 
Crucially, to interpret the estimated coefficients as the causal impact of the new regulation on 
loan interest rates, we need to analyze the parallel trend assumption. The results suggest that this 
assumption is met in our study. Figure 1 plots the monthly average interest rate of newly mortgage 
loans for the treatment and control groups using January 2018 as the reference date. It shows that, 
before the tax law, the average loan rates are very similar. With the entrance into force of the policy 
shift, the interest rate of treated mortgage loans begins to diverge increasing at a higher pace than 
the control mortgage loans. We see some differences already in October, that vanish in the 
econometric specification (Figure 2) – note that as we explain in the previous section there was the 
first announcement of a possible change in the law in mid-October. We can see that both loan 
interest rates follow the increased trend set by the Euribor during that period, highlighting the 
relevance of having a control group that is subject to similar economic developments as the 
treatment group and controlling for variable versus fixed loan rate mortgages. Moreover, for our 
main results we also show the time-varying difference in difference estimated coefficients for each 
month in our sample (Figure 2 and 3), which show parallel trends (see the Results section). 
Complementary to our identification strategy based on regional differences in the introduction 
of the Royal Decree, we also analyze how banks that were differentially affected by the policy 
change reacted. To do so, we classify banks regarding the weight of their mortgage portfolio outside 
the Basque Country at the end of 2017 (when our sample starts) over their total assets, as banks 
most exposed to this type of mortgages should be the ones most affected by the change in the tax 
law. The equation that we estimate in this case is the following: 
.                (3) 
In this specification High Exposure is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the ratio of 
mortgages outside the Basque Country over total assets of the bank that grants the loan is above the 
median value of the distribution, and 0 otherwise; and Xit is a set of household observable 
characteristics and loan controls, as in Eq. (1), and we also include the fixed effects zip 
code*employment status*foreign and type of mortgage loan (fixed or variable rate)*granted time 
(year:month:day); and ηj are bank fixed effects. We also estimate this equation by OLS and the 
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standard errors are multi-clustered at three levels: bank, time, and zip code. In addition to loan 
interest rates, we also analyze volume, maturity, LTV, mortgage amount over liability and defaults. 
Additionally, to test for possible heterogeneous effects of our variable of interest, we estimate 
the analogous of Eq. (3) including an additional interaction term. The equation takes the form:   
 (4) 
where Xj is a vector of bank characteristics, in particular bank NPL which proxies for the strength 
of the bank balance sheet and hence it is a proxy on bank moral hazard issues (see Freixas and 
Rochet, 2008). The higher ex-ante bank NPL, the higher probability of bank failure, and hence 
higher need of rescue by the government or need of central bank public liquidity (implicit 
guarantees), or to activate the deposit insurance (explicit guarantees). 
The previous analyses are done at the loan level but we also work at the bank level when the 
information does not allow a more granular approach (fees) or for some key variables such as bank 
total profits (also split by loan interest income versus loan fees). In particular, we explain the 
interest income of loans over total assets, loan fees over total assets and ROA of the banks using 
quarterly data from 2018Q1 to 2019Q2. The equation estimated in each case is the following: 
(5) 
where ηt are year:quarter time dummies and ηj are bank fixed effects. We estimate the equations by 
OLS and we cluster standard errors at the bank level. Finally, we also analyze mortgage amount 
over liability and consumer lending in a regression similar to equation (1).  
4.1 Summary statistics 
The first part of the paper uses a loan database that consist on all new primary residence 
mortgage loans granted to households in Spain between January 1, 2018, and May 31, 2019.24 Table 
1 reports the mean, standard deviation, first, second and third quartile of the distribution of the main 
variables that we use in the analysis. The sample is classified depending on the value of the 
dummies Post and Treated.  
As Table 1 shows, 43.9% of mortgage loans were granted after the tax change, and the 
percentage of loans potentially affected by this measure represents 94.2% of the overall sample (for 
all the regions, see also Table 2) and 57.4% for the of the sample restricted to the border zip codes 
 
24 As a robustness exercise, in Section 5.1.2, we also show that results are the same if secondary residence mortgages 
are also taken into account. 




standard errors are multi-clustered at three levels: bank, time, and zip code. In addition to loan 
interest rates, we also analyze volume, maturity, LTV, mortgage amount over liability and defaults. 
Additionally, to test for possible heterogeneous effects of our variable of interest, we estimate 
the analogous of Eq. (3) including an additional interaction term. The equation takes the form:   
 (4) 
where Xj is a vector of bank characteristics, in particular bank NPL which proxies for the strength 
of the bank balance sheet and hence it is a proxy on bank moral hazard issues (see Freixas and 
Rochet, 2008). The higher ex-ante bank NPL, the higher probability of bank failure, and hence 
higher need of rescue by the government or need of central bank public liquidity (implicit 
guarantees), or to activate the deposit insurance (explicit guarantees). 
The previous analyses are done at the loan level but we also work at the bank level when the 
information does not allow a more granular approach (fees) or for some key variables such as bank 
total profits (also split by loan interest income versus loan fees). In particular, we explain the 
interest income of loans over total assets, loan fees over total assets and ROA of the banks using 
quarterly data from 2018Q1 to 2019Q2. The equation estimated in each case is the following: 
(5) 
where ηt are year:quarter time dummies and ηj are bank fixed effects. We estimate the equations by 
OLS and we cluster standard errors at the bank level. Finally, we also analyze mortgage amount 
over liability and consumer lending in a regression similar to equation (1).  
4.1 Summary statistics 
The first part of the paper uses a loan database that consist on all new primary residence 
mortgage loans granted to households in Spain between January 1, 2018, and May 31, 2019.24 Table 
1 reports the mean, standard deviation, first, second and third quartile of the distribution of the main 
variables that we use in the analysis. The sample is classified depending on the value of the 
dummies Post and Treated.  
As Table 1 shows, 43.9% of mortgage loans were granted after the tax change, and the 
percentage of loans potentially affected by this measure represents 94.2% of the overall sample (for 
all the regions, see also Table 2) and 57.4% for the of the sample restricted to the border zip codes 
 
24 As a robustness exercise, in Section 5.1.2, we also show that results are the same if secondary residence mortgages 




standard errors are multi-clustered at three levels: bank, time, and zip code. In addition to loan 
interest rates, we also analyze volume, maturity, LTV, mortgage amount over liability and defaults. 
Additionally, to test for possible heterogeneous effects of our variable of interest, we estimate 
the analogous of Eq. (3) including an additional interaction term. The equation takes the form:   
 (4) 
where Xj is a vector of bank characteristics, in particular bank NPL which proxies for the strength 
of the bank balance sheet and hence it is a proxy on bank moral hazard issues (see Freixas and 
Rochet, 2008). The higher ex-ante bank NPL, the higher probability of bank failure, and hence 
higher need of rescue by the government or need of central bank public liquidity (implicit 
guarantees), or to activate the deposit insurance (explicit guarantees). 
The previous analyses are done at the loan level but we also work at the bank level when the 
information does not allow a more granular approach (fees) or for some key variables such as bank 
total profits (also split by loan interest income versus loan fees). In particular, we explain the 
interest income of loans over total assets, loan fees over total assets and ROA of the banks using 
quarterly data from 2018Q1 to 2019Q2. The equation estimated in each case is the following: 
(5) 
where ηt are year:quarter time dummies and ηj are bank fixed effects. We estimate the equations by 
OLS and we cluster standard errors at the bank level. Finally, we also analyze mortgage amount 
over liability and consumer lending in a regression similar to equation (1).  
4.1 Summary statistics 
Th  first part of the paper uses a loan database that consist on all new primary residen e
mortgag  loans gr n ed o hous h lds in Spain b tween January 1, 2018, and May 31, 2019.24 Table 
1 reports the mean, standard deviation, first, second and third quartile of the distribution of the main 
variables that we use in the analysis. The sample is classified depending on the value of the 
dummies Post and Treated.  
As Tabl 1 shows, 43.9% of mortgage loans were granted after the tax c ange, and the
percentage of loans potentially affected by this measure represents 94.2% of the overall sample (for 
all the regions, see also Table 2) and 57.4% for the of the sample restricted to the border zip codes 
 
24 As a robustness exercise, in Section 5.1.2, we also show that results are the same if secondary residence mortgages 




around the Basque Country (see also Table 3). The main dependent variable, the interest rate 
charged to the mortgage loans, has an average value of 2.07 with a large dispersion evidenced by a 
coefficient of variation of 48%. The average value of the maturity (in months) of the mortgage is 
299 while the average loan amount (in euros) is 117,607. Mortgage defaults are 5.8%, which 
include loan delinquencies and borrower-driven moratoria during the Covid-19 crisis. We also 
study other key dependent variables for mortgage data: loan amount over mortgage liability (costly 
insurance for mortgages) with an average value of 73%; and LTV, with an average value of 65.9.25 
Regarding household (borrower) characteristics, the log of the gross income (in euros) has a 
mean of 10.29 and a standard deviation of 0.19 (the average gross income is 29,995 Euros). For 8% 
of the households, the head of the family (older member of household) is a public servant, for 2.8% 
a pensioner, for 1.4% an employee of the same bank group that the bank that granted the loan, for 
2.8% a student, and for 2% either home employed or unemployed. The omitted category includes 
the rest of employed workers. The average log of age (in months) of the head of the family is 6.15 
(40 years old). The average value of the log of one plus the number of banks with which the 
household has a loan at the end of 2017 is 0.33 (that corresponds to 0.52 banks), and the average of 
the log of one plus the number of banks that have a branch operating in the zip code of the mortgage 
real estate is 1.9 (which corresponds to 5.7 banks).  
Regarding the average characteristics of the lender just prior to our sample (at the end of 
2017), the log of total assets has a mean of 18.62 (230,510 million euros), 8.49% is the average 
value for the capital ratio, and the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio has an average value of 6%. 
The average weight of loans to households over the total portfolio of the bank accounts for 26%. 
The bank that granted the mortgage was the main lender of the households as of December 2017 for 
the 16% of the loans analyzed and 24% of the times the main lender in a zip code is the provider of 
the mortgage. A key treatment variable for part of our analysis (Section 5.2.1) is whether the lender 
has a high exposure to mortgages outside the Basque Country, and, hence, it is potentially more 
affected by the change in the tax law. As we define this variable as whether the exposure is higher 
than the median, we have the average of high exposure being 0.54. We also use some bank level 
variables as dependent variables to check the overall impact of the law on some bank variables such 
as bank profits (ROA with an average of 0.51%), fees related to loans over total assets (with an 
average of 0.08%) and interest income from loans over total assets (with an average of 0.94%). 
 
25 We analyze these variables as dependent variables in some regressions (see Table 7), but also as (endogenous) 
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controls in some columns (e.g. last two columns in Table 2) to test the stability of the main estimated coefficient.  
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The last part of the paper uses the consumer loans database that includes the consumer loan 
applications, and, as in the previous part of the paper, all the new granted consumer loans. 51% of 
the loan applications are accepted and granted during our sample period. The average interest rate 
of newly granted consumer loans is 9.5%, much higher than that of mortgages (as these loans are 
much riskier), where the average (log) size and maturity of the consumer loan is 8.7 and 3.9, 
respectively (which corresponds to 9,693 euros and 58 months). The future default rate is also very 
high (12.2%) for this type of loans. 
5. Results  
In this section we first analyze in section 5.1 the effects that the shift in statutory incidence 
has on mortgage rates, documenting how there is a strong, positive (but not full) pass-through to 
mortgage rates, which is highly dependent on borrower characteristics, most of them related to 
borrowers’ bargaining power. We then, in section 5.2, analyze the effects of the shift in the tax on 
two main risk-taking decisions of banks associated to loans to households: the mortgage liability 
ratio (costly insurance) and the probability of granting (much riskier) consumer credit (which was 
not affected by the law), suggesting that the policy change increases risk-taking by banks by more 
affected banks (consistent with the policy reducing bank profits given that banks do not fully pass 
through the tax). 
5.1 Impact on mortgage interest rates  
Table 2 reports the results of Equation (1), the difference-in-differences specification to 
capture the casual impact of the change in the tax law on the interest rate of mortgages. We show a 
step-by-step analysis where each new specification adds more controls to the previous ones (starting 
with no controls whatsoever in column (1) to fully saturating the regression in column (8)). To 
avoid different estimated coefficients due to changes in the sample, we use an identical sample of 
168,250 mortgages, the one associated with the most saturated specification. 
In column (1) of Table 2 there are no controls. The estimated coefficient () is 0.153**.26 
Column (2) includes bank, time (year:month) and type of the mortgage (fixed or variable rates) 
fixed effects.27 The estimated coefficient decreases to 0.095** (though the two coefficients are not 
statistically different, as one standard deviation is around 0.5). Column (3) saturates model (2) with 
the triple interaction bank*time*fixed/variable interest rate fixed effects (the estimated coefficient 
 
26 *** implies statistically significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%, in which the standard errors 
are corrected for multi-clustering at the bank, time and zip code level.  
27 The key control that changes the estimated coefficient is type of the mortgage (fixed or variable rates), which is 
necessary to compare mortgages within either fixed or variable rate. 
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equals 0.099**) and column (4) changes the time to control for year:month:day fixed effects. The 
estimated coefficient does not change significantly from the previous specification, 0.106**.  
In the next estimations (columns) we control for potential unobservable confounding factors 
by proxying the income and wealth of households to reduce the differences between the mortgages 
in the control and in the treatment group (see also Table A1 of the Appendix and previous section). 
Column (5) adds the zip code*employment status fixed effects and column (6) splits these fixed 
effects into foreign and national households. Column (7) adds loan characteristics (size and 
maturity) and column (8) the rest of household controls xplained in Table 1, i  which the estimated
oefficient on the treatment variable is 0.106***.  
Thus, results suggest that, after the introduction of the Royal Decree, banks increase mortgage 
interest rates by around 10 basis points on average, which accounts for a 5% increase on mortgage 
rates (see Table 1). In terms of the quantification of the results with respect the potential interest 
rate that banks should have charged to fully compensate the cost of the new tax, we show, through 
simulations (see Section 5.1.4), at, on average, the 10 stimated basis points represents around
80% of the increas  in cost due to the tax change. It is important t  note that in this est mation we
are assuming that banks react only through hanges in the mortgage rates and not through changes
in other fees as w  do not have loan-level inf rmation about mortgage related fees. However, as we
s ow in section 5.2, we do not fin  that more aff c ed banks diff rentially change loan related
fees;28 moreover, total bank profits for more affected banks (the ones with higher volume of 
mortgages in treated areas) are reduced after the law as compared to less affected banks, again 
suggesting that banks do not fully pass-through the tax. 
Finally, given that the R-squared increases from 34.1% in column (2) to 70.1% in column (8), 
doubling the R-squared and with an absolute increase of more than 35 percentage points, while the 
estimated value of the coefficient of interest does not decrease and it is very similar (0.095 versus 
0.106), results suggest that, following Oster (2019) and Altonji et al. (2005), the estimated effects 
do not suffer from biases due to (further unobservable) omitted variables.29 
5.1.1 Adjoining zip codes to the border of the Basque Country 
Despite the stability of the estimated coefficient across very different set of controls, to further 
increase the similarities between the treated and control groups, in this subsection we consider only 
 
28 Given the assumptions we make in our simulation, which are explained in more detail in Section 5.1.4, we see this 
80% figure as representing a conservative upper bound of the pass through.  
29 Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2019) analyse the sensitivity of the estimation results to the inclusion of observable 
and unobservable controls checking the stability of the explanatory variable of interest to significant increases in the R-
squared.  
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those mortgage loans granted in the municipalities around the border of the Basque Country. In 
Table A1 of the Appendix we show that this strategy is useful to reduce differences in observable 
characteristics of households, but has the disadvantage of greatly reducing the number of 
observations: from 168,250 to 1,121, a 99% reduction in the sample. Nevertheless, Table 3 shows
identical results.  
Table 3 follows the same structure as Table 2 where we progressively saturate the 
specifications. Analogously, we find very similar results along all the columns within Table 3, and 
also between Table 3 and Table 2. In column (7), the most saturated regression, the esti ated 
impact of the tax reform on mortgage loans is around 10 basis points, which is identical to Table 2 
(although only statistically significant at 10% due to higher standard errors, as the number of 
observations is much lower and we still triple cluster standard errors). As in Table 2, column 2 and 
the last column of Table 3 have identical estimated coefficients despite the substantial change in 
controls (0.108 versus 0.100).  
5.1.2 Further robustness tests  
 In Table 4 we show further robustness tests. First, we analyze whether there are regional 
differences in the impact of the tax reform depending on the tax rate charged by the regions before 
the introduction of the Royal Decree. As previously discussed, outside the Basque Country, tax 
rates were between 0.5% and 1.5%, with the more common base tax rate being 1.5% (see Table A3 
in the Appendix). The first four columns of Table 4 exploit these regional differences. Column (1) 
replicates the same model that he one sh wed in the last column of Table 2 but for the mortgages 
charged with a tax lower than 1% (where the control group is still the Basque Country). The number 
of observations drops to 43,981 and the estimated coefficient is 0.073**. Column (2) considers only 
mortgages with a tax rate of at least 1%, plus all those granted in the Basque Country (the control 
group). The estimate is now higher, 0.118***, as expected. Column (3) follows a different approach 
in the treatment and uses as the control group all mortgages with a tax rate lower than 1% 
(excluding those from the Basque Country) and as a treatment group all mortgages with a tax rate 
higher than 1%. In such case the estimated coefficient is 0.069**.  
Column (4) presents the results when we include the level of the tax rate instead of the treated 
dummy. In such case, we obtain that the coefficient is 0.078**. Therefore, results suggest that, for 
banks, the intensity of the pass-through is proportional to the magnitude of the impact of the 
measure, captured by the ex-ante level of the tax rate. Moreover, the result derived from the 
intensity treatment is in line with the 10 basis points estimated for the baseline model given that if 
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the tax rate increases (from 0%) to 1.28% (the average tax rate for treated regions), then the interest 
rate would increase 10.0 (=0.078*1.28*100) basis points.  
With the aim of mitigating the effect of other possible contemporaneous shocks, or the impact 
of other subsequent spillover effects, column (5) only considers the mortgages granted in a window 
of 2 weeks before and after the Royal Decree. Again, there is an important reduction in the number 
of mortgages analyzed, of around 97%, but nevertheless the estimated coefficient on the treatment 
is 0.088**, which is very similar to our baseline estimation. Figure 2 (see below also) shows time-
varying estimated coefficients for each month: there is a fast adjustment and then the coefficients 
keep constant over the following months. Moreover, while we do not observe any aggregate effects 
in the total volume of mortgages granted around the announcement (not reported), in column (6) we 
estimate our coefficients excluding October and November 2018 in order to exclude any strategic 
behaviors around the announcement date. The estimated coefficient is now 0.117***, again very 
similar to the main one. 
Column (7) analyzes a much smaller set of mortgages related to secondary residence, which 
were subject in the Basque Country to a 0.5% tax rate, and, given the special status of the Basque 
Country, were not subject to a change in statutory incidence. We show how in such case the pass-
through is still positive but lower, with an estimated coefficient of 0.054*. Finally, the last column 
of Table 4 substitute the interest rate at origination with the interest rate at July 2020 (the latest 
available date) to take into account whether there are some adjustments over the life of the loan for 
all mortgages or from some mortgages that have a mixed interest rate (during the first few months a 
fixed interest rate is paid and then it changes to a variable one). Results do not change (0.112***). 
Lastly, we analyze the key diff-in-diff assumption in which the validity of our results relies in 
the absence of pre-trends in the treatment versus control groups. Moreover, all of our results are 
based on the assumption that the banks reacted after the date the Royal Decree went into effect, not 
earlier, and for later dates an average effect is computed. All these assumptions can be checked 
allowing the coefficient on the Treated variable to vary over time. This is what we do in Figure 2, 
which can also be seen as a placebo test for the dates before the measure was taken (allowing us to 
further exclude possible anticipation effects). Figure 2 shows the year:month estimated coefficients 
for our baseline specification. The estimated coefficient is insignificant before November 2018 
(2018M11) and then becomes statistically significant.30 Note that effects are not increasing over 
 
30 The reason why the effect somewhat fades in May 2019 may be due to the entry of the new mortgage law (Ley 
5/2019) in June 2019, which was approved in March 2019, as discussed in Section 2. 
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time (e.g. as menu costs/sticky prices type of argument would imply), not even when we use the last 
available mortgage loan rate in July 2020. 
5.1.3 Heterogeneity 
We explore the existence of heterogeneous effects on the impact of the policy shift on 
mortgage rates at the household level (as well as at the bank and loan level) in Table 5, where we 
show the results of estimating Equation (2). We start with the household dimension by first 
introducing the interaction of the treatment variable with the log of gross income and then later 
adding, progressively, the rest of household variables (columns (1) to (3)). We then introduce bank 
characteristics, including bank-borrower variables, in particular the number of banks in the zip code 
of the household and the number of previous banking relationships (columns (4)). In column (5) we 
tests the robustness of the estimation controlling for (endogenous) loan characteristics (size and 
maturity), and column (6) also controls for loan amount/mortgage liability (the insurance for the 
bank). It is important to note that when we introduce interactions into the estimation, we demean all 
variables, so that the variables in levels reflect the average impact. 
Our results suggest that borrower income as well as borrower variables further proxying for 
borrower bargaining power play a prominent role in the heterogeneous transmission of the tax to 
mortgage rates.  
Looking at column (6), the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the interaction 
of the treatment variable with the log of the gross income of the household, -0.274**, indicates that 
the richer households are less affected by the pass-through (less increase in loan rates due to the 
policy change). A 30% increase in borrower’s income, that corresponds to the difference between 
households in the 25% and 75% of the income distribution (see Table 1), decreases loan interest 
rates in 8 basis points after the tax change, similar to the average level effect that we find in Table 2.  
Moreover, when the number of banks in the zip code of the mortgage (a proxy of bank 
competition) increases, the pass-through of the tax law is (relatively) lower (-0.034*, column (6)). 
This result is consistent with borrower’s bargaining power, as with a higher number of banks, the 
borrower has more opportunities to switch to a lender that offers a lower loan interest rate. Further, 
the pass-through is lower for households with more bank relationships ex-ante (-0.102*, column 
(6)), which again is consistent with such households having a higher bargaining power as it is easier 
for them to find a cheaper mortgage offer. Effects are also quantitatively strong: an increase of the 
number of bank relations distribution, that corresponds to the difference between households in the 
25% and 75%, (relatively) decreases loan interest rates after the tax change in 8 basis points. 
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Our results also show that there is a group of borrowers that is not affected by the policy 
change: borrowers who work in the lender’s banking group (-0.170**, column (6)).31 Mortgages to 
employees of banking groups are special given the existence of collective agreements between the 
bank and its workers which (generally) involve mortgage loans with an advantageous pre-
established interest rate and they are negotiated every year.  
The heterogeneity in the pass-through of the tax reflects that statutory incidence has highly 
asymmetric effects on borrowers. This highlights the relevance of borrower characteristics (most of 
them related to borrowers’ bargaining power) for the overall effects of changing the statutory 
incidence of the tax. One relevant issue regarding our heterogeneity in pass-through results is that, 
even though we control for a variety of household characteristics, some of these variables could be 
proxying for different risk profiles of the borrower, which would also affect the pass-through. We 
analyze in more detail this issue in section 5.1.4 and our results suggest that observed differences in 
the pass-through cannot be explained by differences in unobservable borrower’s risk. 
Finally, we also find heterogeneous results in the pass-through regarding bank variables. 
More capitalized banks and those more specialized on households are those for which the 
transmission of the policy change to loan interest rates is higher. For instance, an additional 
percentage point of the leverage ratio (or of the ratio between loans to households over total assets) 
increases the interest rate by 4.5% (0.5%). There is also some weaker evidence, column (6), that 
banks with riskier assets and hence weaker balance sheets (proxied by higher NPLs) increase the 
pass-through to loan rates after the tax reform.32  
5.1.4 Pass-through: further quantitative analyses 
In this section we analyze whether the observed pass-through is enough (a full pass-through) 
to compensate banks for the increase in their lending costs stemming from the statutory shift as well 
as whether the large borrower heterogeneity in the pass-through is explained by a change in 
borrower risk. The principle of statutory irrelevance predicts that the observed pass-through in 
mortgage rates should compensate banks for their increase in lending costs and, therefore, banks’ 
 
31 It is worth noting that the value of the coefficient depends on the omitted (reference) group and also that this variable 
is correlated with other characteristics of the borrower or of the loan. When it is included alone in the regression, the 
estimated coefficient is -0.115**, which is similar to the average effect of the pass-through but with the opposite sign, 
and hence there is no significant pass-through for these borrowers. 
32 The increase is higher the higher the capital to asset ratio of the bank, which we argue is consistent with equity being 
the more expensive source of financing for the banks (Freixas and Rochet, 2008) and hence the shift being more costly 
for those banks. The increase is also higher for banks with higher ratio of household to total assets (consistent with these 
banks being more specialized in loans mortgages). Finally, the increase is higher both for smaller banks (as these banks 
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profits should not be affected by the shift, i.e. we should observe a full pass-through (see also next 
subsection, for the analysis of bank-level profits, loan fees and loan interest income).  
W  first compute the present value of our estimated 10 basis points for the average mortgage 
and compare it to the bse ved tax, concluding that ou  analysis uggests that banks did not apply a 
full pass-through of the tax. Second, we perform a quantitative analysis, including a loan by loan 
n l sis, to study the relevance of (unobserved) borr wer risk factors as  main driver of the large 
documented heterogeneous p ss-through, and co clude that observed heterogeneity cannot
plausibly be explained by unobserved differences in risk. Third, we perform another loan by loan 
analysis but in this case we simulate the interest rates that would fully compensate the cost of the 
tax for banks for each mortgage granted in treated regions. Our analysis suggest, in line with the 
previous exercises, that there was not a full pass-through of the tax on average nor on the 
heterogeneous borrower effects (that we find significant in Table 5). Interestingly, by using loan 
specific discount rates, our loan by loan results further suggest that the observed heterogeneity in 
pass-through is not explained by unobserved risk factors.  
As a first exercise, we compute the present value of our estimated 10 (yearly) basis points 
pass-through for the average mortgage. In doing so, given that we observe loan amount, maturity 
and interest rate of each mortgage, the main challenge is the choice of the appropriate discount rate, 
which is not observed. We proceed by assuming two discount rates: (i) a conservative discount rate 
that equals the average yield of the (safer) 10-year Spanish government bond in our sample period, 
which is 1.33% and (ii) a more realistic discount rate that equals the observed rate of the average 
mortgag , hich is 2.1%, in line with a yi ld t  maturity argument. Applying standard actuarial 
formulas and the characteristics f the av rage mo tgage, we obtain that the estimated 10 basis 
points account for a present value of 1,472 or 1,332 Euros, respectively. Comparing these values 
with the average tax for treated mortgages after the shift, which accounts for 1,774 Euros, suggests 
that banks did not fully pass-through the cost of the tax when the statutory incidence shifted. Our 
results suggest an average pass-through ranging from 75% (with the borrower yield to maturity) to
83% (with the safer government bond), which sug ests that the average pass-through was aro nd
80%.33 For example, considering the more realistic yield to maturity, this result suggests that the 
observed pass-through for the average mortgage is 3 basis points lower than the one that would 
result from a full pass-through; as a further check, we perform a loan by loan analysis using each 
 
33  Using an extremely conservative rate equal to the minimum of the government bond yield in our sample equal to 
0.75% (May 2019), the net present value accounts for 1556 Euros (an 87% pass-through).  
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mortgage, which is 2.1%, in line with a yield to maturity argument. Applying standard actuarial 
formulas and the characteristics of the average mortgage, we obtain that the estimated 10 basis 
points account for a present value of 1,472 or 1,332 Euros, respectively. Comparing these values 
with the average tax for treated mortgages after the shift, which accounts for 1,774 Euros, suggests 
that banks did not fully pass-through the cost of the tax when the statutory incidence shifted. Our 
results suggest an average pass-through ranging from 75% (with the borrower yield to maturity) to 
83% (with the safer government bond), which suggests that the average pass-through was around 
80%.33 For example, considering the more realistic yield to maturity, this result suggests that the 
observed pass-through for the average mortgage is 3 basis points lower than the one that would 
result from a full pass-through; as a further check, we perform a loan by loan analysis using each 
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profits should not be affected by the shift, i.e. we should observe a full pass-through (see also next 
subsection, for the analysis of bank-level profits, loan fees and loan interest income).  
We first compute the present value of our estimated 10 basis points for the average mortgage 
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full pass-through of the tax. Second, we perform a quantitative analysis, including a loan by loan 
analysis, to study the relevance of (unobserved) borrower risk factors as a main driver of the large 
documented heterogeneous pass-through, and conclude that observed heterogeneity cannot 
plausibly be explained by unobserved differences in risk. Third, we perform another loan by loan 
analysis but in this case we simulate the interest rates that would fully compensate the cost of the 
tax for banks for each mortgage granted in treated regions. Our analysis suggest, in line with the 
previous exercises, that there was not a full pass-through of the tax on average nor on the 
heterogeneous borrower effects (that we find significant in Table 5). Interestingly, by using loan 
specific discount rates, our loan by loan results further suggest that the observed heterogeneity in 
pass-through is not explained by unobserved risk factors.  
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which is not observed. We proceed by assuming two discount rates: (i) a conservative discount rate 
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loans’ haracteristics (maturity, loan amount, tax) and obtain that the observed pass-throu h for the
average mortgage is 5 b sis points l w r than the full pass through.34 
 a second ex rcis , we turn to analyze the relevance of mortgage defaults for our
estimati ns. We do so by considerin  the possibility of mor g ges defaulting, a d as a result banks
not obtaining all the pro ised payments in case of default. We assum that in case of mortg ge
default the loss given default is qual to 15%.35 For the average mortgage, we obt in the increase in
probability of default that would be consistent with a given (observ d) increase in mortgage rates
assuming that bank profits remain equal. This analysis llows u  to understand whether the lar
documented eterogeneous pass-through effects from Table 5 could be drive  by unobserved risk
characteristics of the borrowers 
Using the characteristics of the average mortgage in our sample, we simulate the increase in 
mortgage rates that would be consistent with a 1% increase in the probability of default of the 
mortgage.36 We obtain that the simulated difference in the pass-through between a risk-free 
mortgage and a mortgage that after the policy shift increases in 1% its probability of default is 2.1 
(1.5) basis points, where we are assuming a conservative discount rate equal to the average of the 
Spanish Government bond yield (a discount rate equal to the average mortgage rate). This 
simulation highlights that our observed differences in heterogeneous pass-through for certain 
borrower characteristics such as income or number of bank relationships, which are 8 and 7 basis 
points (see Table 5) for individuals in the 75% vs. the 25% of the distribution, are not (plausibly) 
driven by differences in underlying risk profiles of those individuals. Note that for the period pre-
policy shift, see Table 6 Panel A, we find very small differences in pricing and loan defaults based 
on differences income and number of relationships; moreover, the ex-ante number of bank 
relationships that a borrower has would even have the opposite sign to explain the change in pass-
through after the policy shift.  
As our two main (economically significant) measures of borrower heterogeneity are income 
and number of bank relationships, in Table 6 Panel A we perform a regression (exploiting all loan 
by loan heterogeneity) in order to obtain, before and after the policy shift, the difference in loan 
rates (column (1)), as well as the difference of the implied probabilities of default that are consistent 
 
34  The difference between 3 and 5 basis points suggest possible relevant heterogeneous effects in the pass-through. 
35  This LGD is larger than any of the historical estimations (even in the worst months of the financial crisis) of banks’ 
advance internal rate based (IRB) model parameters in Spain (recall that mortgages in Spain are full recourse). This 
choice results in a conservative estimation of the effects of default (in the sense of allowing default to have a larger 
explanatory power). 
36  Our simulation is based on obtaining the probabilities of default which make the net present value for the bank of 
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relationships that a borrower has would even have the opposite sign to explain the change in pass-
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As our two main (economically significant) measures of borrower heterogeneity are income 
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by loan heterogeneity) in order to obtain, before and after the policy shift, the difference in loan 
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with the observed differences in rates both ex ante and ex post.37 Before the policy shift, for 
individuals in the 25% versus those in the 75% percentile of the distribution for income (number of 
bank rela ionships), the observe  difference in mortgage ra es is 7 (-7) basis points. This diff rence
of mortgage rates before the policy shift would be consistent with a 3.6% (-3.6%) difference in the 
probability of default for those individuals with difference income (number of bank relationships).38  
Moreover, after the policy shift, the observed difference in mortgage rates is 15 (0) basis 
points, consistent with the pass-through due to the shift in statutory incidence of 8 and 7 basis 
points shown in Table 5. This difference of mortgage rates during the period after the policy shift 
would be consistent with a probability of default of 6.8% (0%) for those individuals on the 75% vs. 
25% of the distribution for income (number of bank relationships). Therefore, the difference in the 
probabilities of default in the pre- versus post-policy shift consistent with the observed differences 
in mortgage rates are 3.2% (3.6% versus 6.8%) for income and 3.6% (-3.6% versus 0%) for number 
of bank relationships. The result suggest that borrower risk profiles cannot explain the observed 
heterogeneity in the pass-through, as the risk profiles of individuals would have had to change 
dramatically after the shift, both in value and direction (see also next paragraph). Regarding value, 
recall from previous sections that the tax on average is very small (around 1,800 Euros) compared 
to mortgage volume (around 116,000 Euros) and that e.g. the difference in income from the 75% 
(around 34,000 euros) to the 25% (25,000 euros) are 9,000 euros.  
Furthermore, to show that borrower risk is not driving the results, in column (2) of Table 6 
Panel A, we show that the defaults associated to the number of bank relationships after the policy 
shift in the treated versus control group increases, while the increase in mortgage rates (pass-
through) is lower (column (1)). Hence, lower pass-through on mortgage rates cannot be due to 
lower borrower risk. Moreover, as we can also see in column (2), borrowers with more ex-ante 
number of bank relationships tend to have on average higher defaults (i.e., the result on defaults 
associated to households with higher number of bank relationships is a general result, not just after 
the policy shift).39 Differently, for income, households with higher income tend to default less on 
average. However, notice that there is no further differential default effects after the policy shift for 
treated versus control areas depending on borrower income. All in all, results suggest that the 
heterogeneity we find in the pass-through is not driven by borrower risk.  
 
37  The regression is the same as the one in Table 5 but using province fixed effects instead of zip code level fixed 
effects to be able to estimate level effects. 
38  We find that, in line with these numbers, income (number of relationships) is negatively (positively) and statistically 
significant related with ex-post delinquencies. See column 2 of Table 6 Panel A. 
39  For previous research analysing how the number of bank relationships is positively related to borrower risk, see 
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shift in the treated versus control group increases, while the increase in mortgage rates (pass-
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lower borrower risk. Moreover, as we can also see in column (2), borrowers with more ex-ante 
number of bank relationships tend to have on average higher defaults (i.e., the result on defaults 
associated to households with higher number of bank relationships is a general result, not just after 
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average. However, notice that there is no further differential default effects after the policy shift for 
treated versus control areas depending on borrower income. All in all, results suggest that the 
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to mortgage volume (around 116,000 Euros) and that e.g. the difference in income from the 75% 
(around 34,000 euros) to the 25% (25,000 euros) are 9,000 euros.  
Furthermore, to show that borrower risk is not driving the results, in column (2) of Table 6 
Panel A, we show that the defaults associated to the number of bank relationships after the policy 
shift in the treated versus control group increases, while the increase in mortgage rates (pass-
through) is lower (column (1)). Hence, lower pass-through on mortgage rates cannot be due to 
lower borrower risk. Moreover, as we can also see in column (2), borrowers with more ex-ante 
number of bank relationships tend to have on average higher defaults (i.e., the result on defaults 
associated to households with higher number of bank relationships is a general result, not just after 
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shift in the treated versus control group increases, while the increase in mortgage rates (pass-
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Finally, to further analyze the observed pass-through we perform a loan by l an simulation
analysis. Give that for ach loan we observe the m turity, the lo n amoun , the inter st r t
charged and the cost of the tax ( hich, as previ usly explained, is based on the mortgage liability
a d the pr v iling tax rate in the region), it is possible to simulate for each mortgage loan the
interest rate hat would compensate the cost of the tax for banks (al owing banks to obtain the same
profits as when the tax was paid by the bo rowe s). This rate s an e timate of what the full pass-
through interes  a e would have been. We proc ed by first computing this simulat d interest rate
for each treated mortgage before the tax shift. We then replace, for treated mortgages before the tax
shift, the observed interest rate with the simul te inter st rat s, which give us a benchmark for the
r tes we should have observed before the tax shift if ther  had been a full pass-through in those 
mortgages. Finally, we compare our simulated rates (pre) with the observed rates (post) by 
estimating Eq. (2). If after the shift, there would have been a full pass through, we would expect a 
coefficient of 0 in the treated*post interaction (as well as in the treated*post*borrower key 
variables), as our simulated pre-rates would be equal to the observed post rates. If the observed 
pass-through is below (above) 100% we would expect a negative (positive) coefficient. 
Interestingly, by comparing the value of the coefficients for the interaction terms with the average 
pass-through observed we are able to obtain an estimation the magnitude of the observed pass-
through.  
In Table 6 Panel B we report the results of estimating Eq. (2) with our simulated mortgage
rates for treated mo tgages before the tax shift, f llowing the analys s in Table 5. As before we us
two differ nt discount factors, in column (1) we us  the average of the Spanish Government bond 
yield, and in column (2) we use the observed interest rate as a discount rate (following a yield to 
maturity argument). We find that there is not a full pass through on average (treated*post 
interaction is egative).40 There is als  a ot full pass-through for h  key borrower v riables
driving the borrower heterogeneity i  le 5, i.e., eg tive coefficients for treated*post*borrow r 
for income, number of bank relations, number of banks in the zip code, and whether the borrower 
works for the bank. Interestingly, we find that when we use a discount rate that incorporates 
unobservable loan risk characteristics, our coefficients of interest on heterogeneous borrower’ 
characteristics maintain statistical and economic significance (column (2) of Table 6). This 
 
40 Interestingly we observe that the average pass through is 7 basis points lower than the one that would be needed to 
obtain a full pass-through (based on column 2). Moreover, the difference in intensity of the pass-through we obtain 
when we analyze the average mortgage (3 basis points lower pass through) and the one we obtain in the loan by loan 
analysis (7 basis points lower pass-through) suggest the existence of possible relevant non linearities in the intensity of 
the pass-through.  
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Finally, to further analyze the observed pass-through we perform a loan by loan simulation 
analysis. Given that for each loan we observe the maturity, the loan amount, the interest rate 
charged and the cost of the tax (which, as previously explained, is based on the mortgage liability 
and the prevai ing tax rate in the region), it is possible to simulate for each mortgage loan the 
interest rate that would compensate the cost of the tax for banks (allowing banks to obtain the same 
profits as when the tax was paid by the borrowers). This rate is an estimate of what the full pass-
through interest rate would have been. We proceed by first computing this simulated interest rate 
for each treated mortgage before the tax shift. We then replace, for treated mortgages before the tax 
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40 Interestingly we observe that the average pass through is 7 basis points lower than the one that would be needed to 
obtain a full pass-through (based on column 2). Moreover, the difference in intensity of the pass-through we obtain 
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analysis (7 basis points lower pass-through) suggest the existence of possible relevant non linearities in the intensity of 
the pass-through. 




Finally, to further analyze the observed pass-through we perform a loan by loan simulation 
analysis. Given that for each loan we observe the maturity, the loan amount, the interest rate 
charged and the cost of the tax (which, as previously explained, is based on the mortgage liability 
and the prevailing tax rate in the region), it is possible to simulate for each mortgage loan the 
interest rate that would compensate the cost of the tax for banks (allowing banks to obtain the same 
profits as when the tax was paid by the borrowers). This rate is an estimate of what the full pass-
through interest rate would have been. We proceed by first computing this simulated interest rate 
for each treated mortgage before the tax shift. We then replace, for treated mortgages before the tax 
shift, the observed interest rate with the simulated interest rates, which give us a benchmark for the 
rates we should have observed before the tax shift if there had been a full pass-through in those 
mortgages. Finally, we compare our simulated rates (pre) with the observed rates (post) by 
estimating Eq. (2). If after the shift, there would have been a full pass through, we would expect a 
coefficient of 0 in the treated*post interaction (as well as in the treated*post*borrower key 
variables), as our simulated pre-rates would be equal to the observed post rates. If the observed 
pass-through is below (above) 100% we would expect a negative (positive) coefficient. 
Interestingly, by comparing the value of the coefficients for the interaction terms with the average 
pass-through observed we are able to obtain an estimation the magnitude of the observed pass-
through.  
In Table 6 Panel B we report the results of estimating Eq. (2) with our simulated mortgage 
rates for treated mortgages before the tax shift, following the analysis in Table 5. As before we use 
two different discount factors, in column (1) we use the average of the Spanish Government bond 
yield, and in column (2) we use the observed interest rate as a discount rate (following a yield to 
maturity argument). We find that there is not a full pass through on average (treated*post 
interaction is negative).40 There is also a not full pass-through for the key borrower variables 
driving the borrower heterogeneity in Table 5, i.e., negative coefficients for treated*post*borrower 
for income, number of bank relations, number of banks in the zip code, and whether the borrower 
works for the bank. Interestingly, we find that when we use a discount rate that incorporates 
unobservable loan risk characteristics, our coefficients of interest on heterogeneous borrower’ 
characteristics maintain statistical and economic significance (column (2) of Table 6). This 
 
40 Interestingly we observe that the average pass through is 7 basis points lower than the one that would be needed to 
obtain a full pass-through (based on column 2). Moreover, the difference in intensity of the pass-through we obtain 
when we analyze the average mortgage (3 basis points lower pass through) and the one we obtain in the loan by loan 





Finally, to further analyze the observed pass-through we perform a loan by loan simulation 
analysis. Given that for each loan we observe the maturity, the loan amount, the interest rate 
charged and the cost of the tax (which, as previously explained, is based on the mortgage liability 
and the prevailing tax rate in the region), it is possible to simulate for each mortgage loan the 
interest rate that would compensate the cost of the tax for banks (allowing banks to obtain the same 
profits as when the tax was paid by the borrowers). This rate is an estimate of what the full pass-
through interest rate would have been. We proceed by first computing this simulated interest rate 
for each treated mortgage before the tax shift. We then replace, for treated mortgages before the tax 
shift, the observed interest rate with the simulated interest rates, which give us a benchmark for the 
rates we should have observed before the tax shift if there had been a full pass-through in those 
mortgages. Finally, we compare our simulated rates (pre) with the observed rates (post) by 
estimating Eq. (2). If after the shift, there would have been a full pass through, we would expect a 
coefficient of 0 in the treated*post interaction (as well as in the treated*post*borrower key 
variables), as our simulated pre-rates would be equal to the observed post rates. If the observed 
pass-through is below (above) 100% we would expect a negative (positive) coefficient. 
Interestingly, by comparing the value of the coefficients for the interaction terms with the average 
pass-through observed we are able to obtain an estimation the magnitude of the observed pass-
through.  
In Table 6 Panel B we report the results of estimating Eq. (2) with our simulated mortgage 
rates for treated mortgages before the tax shift, following the analysis in Table 5. As before we use 
two different discount factors, in column (1) we use the average of the Spanish Government bond 
yield, and in column (2) we use the observed interest rate as a discount rate (following a yield to 
maturity argument). We find that there is not a full pass through on average (treated*post 
interaction is negative).40 There is also a not full pass-through for the key borrower variables 
driving the borrower heterogeneity in Table 5, i.e., negative coefficients for treated*post*borrower 
for income, number of bank relations, number of banks in the zip code, and whether the borrower 
works for the bank. Interestingly, we find that when we use a discount rate that incorporates 
unobservable loan risk characteristics, our coefficients of interest on heterogeneous borrower’ 
characteristics maintain statistical and economic significance (column (2) of Table 6). This 
 
40 Interestingly we observe that the average pass through is 7 basis points lower than the one that would be needed to 
obtain a full pass-through (based on column 2). Moreover, the difference in intensity of the pass-through we obtain 
when w  analyze the average mortgage (3 basis points lower p ss through) and th  one we ob ain in the loan by loan





suggests, in line with our revious exercises, that the difference in pass-through cannot e 
(plausibly) explained by risk factors which ould already be incorporated in the mortgage rates.  
5.1.5 The effects n other m rtgage terms 
Table 7 presents the estimation results of our baseline model for different dependent 
mortgage variables: the loan amount, the maturity, loan-to-value ratio and the mortgage liability 
ratio and defaults. For the first two regressions we resort to esti ate a Poisson model in order to 
reduce possible biases arising from a classical log linear estimation (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 
2006),41 while we use an OLS estimation for the other two variables. Robust standard errors are 
again corrected for clustering at the bank, year:month:day and zip code level. The mortgage liability 
ratio is the logit transformation of the ratio of the loan amount over the mortgage liability (given 
that in our data it is bounded by 0 and 1), thus higher values of this ratio, keeping the numerator 
fixed, are due to reductions in the mortgage liability.  
Columns (1) to ( ) of Table 7 show that the tax reform has no effect on the loan amount 
(neither at loan level or intensive margin, column (1), nor at zip-code level or extensive margin, 
column (2)), on the maturity (column (3)), on the loan to value ratio (column (4)) or on future 
defaults (column (6)), which include loan delinquencies as well as mortgages under moratorium 
driven by borrowers during the Covid-19 crisis.42 However, it affects the mortgage liability ratio 
(column (5)). The coefficient on the mortgage liability ratio is positive and statistically significant 
(0.092*), which means that, given that the loan amount is unaffected (column (1)), banks on 
average decrease this (costly) insurance, increasing their risk (as they would hold lower collateral in 
case of loan default).  
To be confident that this observed effect in the mortgage liability ratio is due to the 
introduction of the tax reform, Figure 3 shows the time-varying estimated coefficients for every 
month. The estimated coefficients are close to zero and insignificant until October 2018, and then 
they jump. In November it increases but it is not significant at conventional levels. In December 
2018 the estimated coefficient becomes statistically significant, and stable after that month, which 
suggests that on average banks react by lowering the mortgage liability from the beginning, but 
 
41 Results are the same if we use an OLS estimation instead.  
42 Until now we have seen that, after the policy change, banks react by modifying the interest rates of their mortgages. 
Table A2 in the Appendix shows evidence that the type of loan, borrower and bank characteristics are similar before 
and after the tax change (which also happens for the zip-codes around the border of the Basque Country). Based on the 
results of columns (1) to (4) in Table 7, we argue that the underlying reason for household demand not reacting to 
changes in the tax is given the small amount of the tax for borrowers with respect to the price of the house (the average 
mortgage tax accounts for 1,774 Euros on an average 116,731 Euros mortgage) and that there was an 80% pass-through 
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more strongly after one month. Importantly, this risk-taking result is consistent with the reduction in 
bank profits (see next s bsection) and the incomplete pass-through, as shocks to bank net worth 
(profits) mply more risk-taking in many banking theories (see Freixas and Roche , 2008). 
5.2 Impact on bank’s risk-taking decisions 
In this sect n we proceed to further investigate the possible risk-taking effects of the policy 
change. We proceed by first, using the identification strategy explained in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4), 
analyzing whether banks more affected by the policy—in terms of having a high proportion of their 
assets as mortgages outside of the Basque Country—react differently in the (loan-level) mortgage 
rates, mortgage liability, consumer loans, and if this is especially so for banks with higher moral 
hazard problems, proxied by ex-ante NPLs. We also analyze bank-level loan rates, fees related to 
rates and profits, to test whether more affected banks reduce their profits due to the tax reform 
(confirming our previous results on not a full pass-through) and to test if fee related income (and 
not only loan rate related income) is differentially affected. Once we analyze these results, we end 
in subsection 5.2.2 by analyzing in more detail the risk-taking in mortgage liability and consumer 
loans using the same treatment variable as in section 5.1, i.e. comparing loans in regions that were 
affected versus those in the control region. 
5.2.1 Bank exposure results  
In this subsection we first show the results of the estimation of Eq. (3), where banks are 
classified as more affected by the Royal Decree based on the ex-ante weight of their mortgage 
portfolio outside the Basque Country before the tax reform (more affected by the tax reform). As 
columns (1) and (3) in Panel A of Table 8 show, we find that, in line with the results in section 5.1, 
more affected banks increase more loan rates and reduce more mortgage liabilities of their loans. 
Interestingly, our results suggest that more affected banks risk related decisions are more distorted, 
as not only do they reduce more their mortgage liability, but also increase more the probability of 
granting consumer loans (which are substantially riskier than mortgages), as column (5) of Panel A 
in Table 8 shows. Moreover, results also show that the increase in loan rates, reduction in mortgage 
liability and increase in the probability of granting consumer loans is higher for those more affected 
banks by the policy change with ex-ante weaker balance sheets (proxied by higher ex-ante NPLs), 
see columns (2), (4) and (6).43  
 
43 Note that the positive estimated coefficient for the probability of granting consumer loan applications for more 
affected banks that have higher NPLs is not significant at standard significance levels. 
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We next use bank-level information, Panel B of Table 8, where we find that banks more 
affected by the policy change increase the loan interest income (consistent with the loan-level 
results that s ow that t y increase more the loan rates), but there is no differential change in fees 
related to loans and, given these results and the previous ones from Table 2 and 6, bank profitability
consistently decreases more for more affected banks. That is, results suggest that more affected 
banks lose more with the reform.  
These estimates show how, after versus before the policy change, banks that were more
aff cted by the tax r form (banks more exposed to treated regions) as compared to banks less
affected: (i) increase the interest rate f the mortgages by 11 basis points more; (ii) have a larger
decrease in their ROA of 18% (close to 10 basis points) ; (iii) decrease more the mortgage liability
(higher 3.4% ratio of loan amou t over mortgag l ability); ( v) and increase the probability of
gr ting applications for consume  loans by around 3.7%. Note that all these results are consist nt
with pre ious results and als  with standard moral hazard theories in banking, where the tax reform 
by reducing bank profits (due to the incomplete pass-through) implies higher risk-taking in the 
mortgage market (via reducing costly mortgage insurance) and spillovers in riskier markets (via 
higher granting of loan applications in consumer lending). Moreover, these differential effects are 
even stronger for banks with higher ex-ante NPLs, again consistent with bank moral hazard theories 
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008). 
5.2.2 Further distortionary effects 
We now p oceed to, following the identification t ategy of section 5.1 in which loans are
classified as treat d if they are locat d in the region on which the Royal Decree applies, exploit loan
level information to further analyze the determinants of the aforementioned risk-taking eff cts:
mortgage liability and probability of granting consum r loans. 
Table 9 investigates the heterogeneity of the results for the mortgage liability ratio, similarly 
to Table 5. The most saturated model, presented in column (5), shows that the only borrower 
characteristic that affects the reduction in mortgage liability is whether the borrowers are employees 
of their banking group. It is important to note that we do not find that the mortgage liability is 
lowered for those individuals with differential bargaining power, e.g. higher income, more bank 
relationships or more banks competi g in their neighborhood, which we find is the case for 
mortgage rates. Hence, our results suggest that the lower mortgage rates were not due to lower
mortgage liabilities (and therefore lower tax related costs for the banks) for those individuals. 
Moreover, there are relevant bank characteristics that further increase the reduction in mortgage 
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liability after the tax reform, as especially riskier banks (higher ex-ante NPL and ROA, which also 
proxies for riskier portfolio with higher profits and higher risk) further reduce the subsequent lower 
mortgage liability for treated loans. After the tax reform and for loans in treated areas, the impact on 
mortgage liability doubles for banks with more NPL ratio and increases by 50% for more profitable 
banks (where “more” in both cases implies comparing 75% versus 25% of the distribution). 
Finally, in Table 10 we analyze the consequences that the shift on the tax has on consumer 
loans. Our objective is to further analyze whether banks modify their credit standards for consumer 
loans comparing treatment and control regions as in Equation (1). Importantly these loans were not 
affected by tax shift (i.e. they represent spillovers from the tax reform), and they are substantially 
riskier than mortgages (defaults around 12% and with very high LGD, consistently with loan rates 
for consumer loans of 9.5% as compared to only 2% for mortgages).  
We show the results on the probability of granting of loan applications in the first two 
columns of Table 10. In column (2) the sample is restricted to consumer loan applications made in 
the zip codes adjacent to the border of the Basque Country. In columns (3) to (5) we analyze the 
terms of granted consumer loans: interest rate, loan amount and maturity. Last column of Table 10 
investigates the future performance of the loan to test whether the mortgage tax change increase 
banks’ appetite for risk in consumer loans as a response of the policy change (i.e. they choose the 
riskier consumer loans within the set of the already risky consumer loans). The structure of the 
estimation is identical to the one of Table 7: a Poisson estimation for amount and maturity and an 
OLS for the rest. Standard errors are triple-clustered at the bank, year:month:day and zip code level. 
The time period analyzed is again 20018M1 to 2019M5. We have more than 1.7 million of 
consumer loans. 
 The estimated coefficient on the treatment variable is positive and significant in the analysis 
of loan applications, both for the whole sample and for the border areas surrounding the control 
group. For instance, the 0.023** coefficient implies that, in the treated areas after the tax reform, 
the granting application rate (of the riskiest segment of household loans) increases by 4.5%. 
Differently, there are no statistical effects neither on the loan interest rate nor in the amount or in 
the maturity of granted consumer loans. However, for future default the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant (0.007**), which implies that after the tax shift in treated regions the 
probability of default of the new consumer loans granted after increases by 5.7% with respect to 
control regions, implying riskier strategies in non-affected loans to households (consumer lending), 
which are mostly given by banks more affected by the mortgage tax policy change. Note moreover 




liability after the tax reform, as especially riskier banks (higher ex-ante NPL and ROA, which also 
proxies for riskier portfolio with higher profits and higher risk) further reduce the subsequent lower 
mortgage liability for treated loans. After the tax reform and for loans in treated areas, the impact on 
mortgage liability doubles for banks with more NPL ratio and increases by 50% for more profitable 
banks (where “more” in both cases implies comparing 75% versus 25% of the distribution). 
Finally, in Table 10 we analyze the consequences that the shift on the tax has on consumer 
loans. Our objective is to further analyze whether banks modify their credit standards for consumer 
loans comparing treatment and control regions as in Equation (1). Importantly these loans were not 
affected by tax shift (i.e. they represent spillovers from the tax reform), and they are substantially 
riskier than mortgages (defaults around 12% and with very high LGD, consistently with loan rates 
for consumer loans of 9.5% as compared to only 2% for mortgages).  
We show the results on the probability of granting of loan applications in the first two 
columns of Table 10. In column (2) the sample is restricted to consumer loan applications made in 
the zip codes adjacent to the border of the Basque Country. In columns (3) to (5) we analyze the 
terms of granted consumer loans: interest rate, loan amount and maturity. Last column of Table 10 
investigates the future performance of the loan to test whether the mortgage tax change increase 
banks’ appetite for risk in consumer loans as a response of the policy change (i.e. they choose the 
riskier consumer loans within the set of the already risky consumer loans). The structure of the 
estimation is identical to the one of Table 7: a Poisson estimation for amount and maturity and an 
OLS for the rest. Standard errors are triple-clustered at the bank, year:month:day and zip code level. 
The time period analyzed is again 20018M1 to 2019M5. We have more than 1.7 million of 
consumer loans. 
 The estimated coefficient on the treatment variable is positive and significant in the analysis 
of loan applications, both for the whole sample and for the border areas surrounding the control 
group. For instance, the 0.023** coefficient implies that, in the treated areas after the tax reform, 
the granting application rate (of the riskiest segment of household loans) increases by 4.5%. 
Differently, there are no statistical effects neither on the loan interest rate nor in the amount or in 
the maturity of granted consumer loans. However, for future default the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant (0.007**), which implies that after the tax shift in treated regions the 
probability of default of the new consumer loans granted after increases by 5.7% with respect to 
control regions, implying riskier strategies in non-affected loans to households (consumer lending), 




that the increase in softer lending standards associated to higher ex-post defaults is not compensated 
with higher ex-ante loan interest rates. 
All in all, the results suggest that banks pursue a higher risk-taking strategy both in 
consumer loans and in mortgages due to the mortgage tax shift on statutory incidence. Such 
evidence as well as results in Table 8 and Table 6 are consistent with banks not passing through all 
the cost imposed by the tax change and reacting to the lower bank profits by increasing their risk, 
especially by the banks more subject to moral hazard issues.  
6. Conclusions 
 This paper analyzes the overall and heterogeneous effects of only shifting the agent on 
which taxes are levied (i.e., shifting statutory incidence), without any change in tax rates or tax 
evasion, which improves the identification of (i.e. isolates) statutory tax incidence. We revisit this 
key classical question by exploiting a tax shift in the banking industry (the credit market) in 
conjunction with supervisory mortgage data. In particular, to study (economic) incidence and 
potential distortionary effects of only shifting statutory incidence, we exploit: (i) a policy change in 
Spain in November 2018 that shifts a mortgage tax from being levied on borrowers to being levied 
on lenders, and crucially without any change on the tax rates; (ii) the fact that some areas, for 
historical reasons, are exempt from paying this tax (or have different tax rates); and (iii) matched 
administrative datasets (an exhaustive credit register with borrower and lender information).  
We find that, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases (by 10 basis points), 
consistently with a strong (but not complete) tax pass-through, of approximately 80% of the tax. 
Importantly, we show a large heterogeneity in the pass-through, which is larger for borrowers with 
lower income, less number of lending relationships, not working for the lender, or facing a smaller 
number of banks in their zip-code (consistent with heterogeneity in borrowers’ bargaining power). 
The heterogeneous estimates are quantitatively large and our analysis suggests that they cannot be 
explained by differences in borrower risk. In addition to the non-full pass-through and evidence not 
consistent with statutory incidence being irrelevant for tax incidence, the results further suggest that 
borrowers with weaker (compared to stronger) pass-through increase their relative welfare as they 
obtain the same mortgage at a lower total cost relative to the borrowers with higher pass-through. 
Moreover, despite that there is no change in the tax rate (which could have led to e.g. 
inefficiencies associated with tax increases), and consistent with a non-full pass-through, we find 
that the shift in the statutory incidence of the tax changes key banks’ decisions, in particular those 
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Spain in November 2018 that shifts a mortgage tax from being levied on borrowers to being levied 
on lenders, and crucially without any change on the tax rates; (ii) the fact that some areas, for 
historical reasons, are exempt from paying this tax (or have different tax rates); and (iii) matched 
administrative datasets (an exhaustive credit register with borrower and lender information).  
We find that, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases (by 10 basis points), 
consistently with a strong (but not complete) tax pass-through, of approximately 80% of the tax. 
Importantly, we show a large heterogeneity in the pass-through, which is larger for borrowers with 
lower income, less number of lending relationships, not working for the lender, or facing a smaller 
number of banks in their zip-code (consistent with heterogeneity in borrowers’ bargaining power). 
The heterogeneous estimates are quantitatively large and our analysis suggests that they cannot be 
explained by differences in borrower risk. In addition to the non-full pass-through and evidence not 
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borrowers with weaker (compared to stronger) pass-through increase their relative welfare as they 
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Moreover, despite that there is no change in the tax rate (which could have led to e.g. 
inefficiencies associated with tax increases), and consistent with a non-full pass-through, we find 




related to banks’ risk-taking. We find that banks more affected by the tax shift (those banks with a 
larger share of their assets affected by the tax shift) exhibit a decrease in their profits, and increase 
their risk-taking by reducing costly mortgage insurance in case of loan default and by increasing the 
likelihood of granting applications of non-directly affected but much ex-ante riskier consumer 
lending, experiencing higher ex-post defaults within consumer loans (not compensated with 
differentially higher ex-ante loan rates). Some of these differential effects are stronger for more 
affected banks with characteristics that proxy for higher moral hazard problems (those with weaker 
balance sheets, in terms of higher ex-ante NPLs) that have a higher likelihood of future help from 
taxpayers’ (government) bailouts and/or central banks’ liquidity injections.   
All in all, results suggest strong overall and heterogeneous economic tax incidence effects, as 
well as distortionary effects, of only shifting the agent on which the tax is levied, without changing 
the tax rates. That is, all important economic effects of only shifting statutory (or physical) 
incidence. 
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Mean SD Min Max
Mean S.D. P25 Median P75
LOAN LEVEL
MORTGAGES
Interest rate of the mortgage % 2.068 0.987 1.510 2.118 2.569
Log(Size of the mortgage) Log(Euros) 11.465 0.656 11.060 11.486 11.878
Log(Maturity of the mortgage) Log(Months) 5.656 0.330 5.497 5.720 5.900
Loan Amount/Mortgage Liability % 73.123 13.476 66.667 77.700 83.262
Log(Loan to value (LTV) of the mortgage) Log(%) 4.120 0.440 4.006 4.257 4.377
Future default 0/1 0.058 0.234 0.000 0.000 0.000
Treated 0/1 0.942 0.233 1.000 1.000 1.000
Treated Border 0/1 0.574 0.495 0.000 1.000 1.000
Post 0/1 0.439 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000
Household Characteristics
Log(Gross income) Log(Euros) 10.291 0.189 10.138 10.281 10.435
Public servant 0/1 0.081 0.273 0.000 0.000 0.000
Banking group employee 0/1 0.014 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.000
Student 0/1 0.028 0.165 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unemployed or homemaker 0/1 0.020 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log(Age) Log(Months) 6.153 0.238 5.974 6.155 6.321
Log(1+No.of banking relationships) Log 0.331 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.693
Log(1+No. of banks in the zip code) Log 1.902 0.596 1.609 2.079 2.303
Bank Characteristics
Log(Total assets) Log(1000Euros) 18.626 1.502 17.613 19.546 19.546
Own funds/Total assets % 8.491 2.883 6.156 7.125 9.560
Liquidity ratio % 15.190 11.277 11.415 11.415 17.310
ROA % 0.382 0.432 0.371 0.508 0.587
Non-performing loan (NPL) ratio % 6.592 1.740 5.988 6.150 7.528
Loans to households/Total assets % 26.049 8.366 23.019 27.290 31.139
Main bank 0/1 0.159 0.365 0.000 0.000 0.000
Leader bank in the zip code 0/1 0.241 0.428 0.000 0.000 0.000
High Exposure to Mortgages outside Basque Country 0/1 0.535 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000
CONSUMER LOANS
Loan application 0/1 0.507 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000
Interest rate of the loan 0/1 9.493 4.828 6.688 8.785 10.416
Log(Size of the loan) Log(Euros) 8.748 0.935 8.112 8.765 9.393
Log(Maturity of the loan) Log(Months) 3.936 0.531 3.611 3.912 4.290
Future default 0/1 0.122 0.328 0.000 0.000 0.000
BANK LEVEL
Interest Income of Loans/Total Assets % 0.938 0.367 0.729 0.942 1.172
Loan Fees/Total Assets % 0.079 0.101 0.022 0.044 0.081
ROA % 0.509 0.428 0.355 0.532 0.729 
TABLE 1 















Notes: This table reports means, standard deviations and first/second/third quartiles of the main variables used in the paper. For a 
definition of the variables see the Appendix. 




Dependent Variable: Mortgage interest rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated*Post 0.153** 0.095** 0.099** 0.106** 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.107*** 0.106***
(0.066) (0.047) (0.038) (0.041) (0.038) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
Bank Fixed Effects No Yes - - - - - -
Year:month Fixed Effects No Yes - - - - - -
Fixed/Variable/Mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects No Yes - - - - - -
Bank*Year:month*Fixed/Variable/Mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects No No Yes - - - - -
Bank*Year:month:day*Fixed/Variable/Mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code*Employment Status Fixed Effects No No No No Yes - - -
Zip Code*Employment Status*Foreigner Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics No No No No No No Yes Yes
Household Characteristics No No No No No No No Yes
Observations 168,250 168,250 168,250 168,250 168,250 168,250 168,250 168,250
R-squared 0.024 0.341 0.429 0.596 0.665 0.676 0.697 0.701
TABLE 2 











Notes: The table above reports OLS regression results of the effect of the shift of statutory incidence on interest rates of new granted mortgages between 2018M1 and 2019M5 on the treatment variable 
Treated*Post. Treated is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the primary residence mortgage loans granted in any Spanish provinces but those granted in Basque Country, and zero otherwise. Post 
is a dummy variable that takes one for all the periods after 8 November 2018, and zero otherwise. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors are reported in the row below which are corrected 
for clustering at the bank, time and zip code level, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included, "No" that is not 









Dependent Variable: Mortgage interest rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated*Post 0.177* 0.108** 0.094* 0.107* 0.131** 0.116** 0.100*
(0.090) (0.040) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.057)
Bank Fixed Effects No Yes - - - - -
Year:month Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed/Variable/mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects No Yes - - - - -
Bank*Year:quarter*Fixed/Variable/Mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code*Employment Status Fixed Effects No No No Yes - - -
Zip Code*Employment Status*Foreigner Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics No No No No No Yes Yes
Household Characteristics No No No No No No Yes
Observations 1,121 1,121 1,121 1,121 1,121 1,121 1,121
R-squared 0.033 0.516 0.583 0.632 0.657 0.682 0.690
 
TABLE 3 











Notes: The table above reports OLS regression results of the effect of the shift of statutory incidence on interest rates of new granted mortgages between 2018M1 and 2019M5 on the treatment variable 
Treated*Post for the zip codes adjoining to the border of the non-treated provinces (which are the three provinces of the Basque Country). Treated is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the 
primary residence mortgage loans granted in any Spanish provinces but those granted in Basque Country, and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable that takes one for all the periods after 8 November 2018, 
and zero otherwise. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors are reported in the row below which are corrected for clustering at the time and zip code level, and the corresponding 
significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included, "No" that is not included and "-" that is comprised by the included set of fixed effects. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 




Dependent Variable: Mortgage interest rate




























Treated*Post 0.073** 0.118*** 0.069** 0.078** 0.088** 0.117*** 0.054* 0.112***
(0.027) (0.041) (0.031) (0.030) (0.041) (0.039) (0.033) (0.028)
Bank*Year:month:day*Fixed/Variable/Mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code*Employment Status*Foreigner Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43,981 131,677 158,352 168,250 6,773 147,637 33,029 157,604
















Notes: The table above reports OLS regression results of the effect of the shift of statutory incidence on interest rates of new granted mortgages between 2018M1 and 2019M5 on the treatment variable 
Treated*Post. Treated is (except for column (3), (4) and (7)) a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the primary residence mortgage loans granted in any Spanish provinces but those granted in 
Basque Country, and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable that takes one for all the periods after 8 November 2018, and zero otherwise. Column (1) restricts the sample to loans with a tax rate lower than 
1% plus Basque Country. Column (2) restrict the sample to loans with a tax rate higher than 1% plus Basque Country. Column (3) re-defines the treated group to those loans with a tax rate higher than 1 and the 
sample does not include the Basque Country. Column (4) uses the continuous treatment instead the dummy. Column (5) restricts the sample to two weeks before and after the entry of the law. Column (6) drops 
2018M10 and 2018M11. Column (7) uses only secondary residence mortgages and Treated takes the value of one for the secundary residence mortgage loans granted in any Spanish provinces but those granted 
in Basque Country, and zero otherwise. Column (8) replace the interest rates at origination for those at July 2020. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors are reported in the row below 
which are corrected for clustering at the bank, time and zip code level, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is 
included, "No" that is not included and "-" that is comprised by the included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 




Dependent Variable: Mortgage interest rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated*Post 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.145*** 0.116*** 0.104*** 0.071***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031)
Household Characteristics
Treated*Post*Log(Gross income) -0.313** -0.313** -0.300** -0.314** -0.264** -0.274**
(0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.123) (0.112) (0.110)
Treated*Post*Public servant 0.011 0.002 0.022 0.021 0.021
(0.063) (0.061) (0.064) (0.065) (0.069)
Treated*Post*Banking group employee -0.151* -0.170** -0.201** -0.178* -0.170**
(0.084) (0.084) (0.096) (0.092) (0.083)
Treated*Post*Student 0.036 0.023 0.006 0.006 0.012
(0.079) (0.073) (0.082) (0.075) (0.074)
Treated*Post*Unemployed or homemaker 0.019 0.044 0.076 0.056 0.062
(0.128) (0.126) (0.139) (0.138) (0.137)
Treated*Post*Log(Age) 0.044 0.053 0.094* 0.086
(0.055) (0.058) (0.055) (0.052)
Treated*Post*Log(LTV) 0.023 -0.022 -0.029 -0.043
(0.062) (0.060) (0.050) (0.049)
Treated*Post*Log(1+No. of banks in the zip code) -0.038* -0.033* -0.034*
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Treated*Post*Log(1+No.of banking relationships) -0.102** -0.101** -0.102**
(0.049) (0.043) (0.042)
Bank Characteristics
Treated*Post*Log(Total assets) 0.005 0.014 -0.087**
(0.021) (0.022) (0.036)
Treated*Post*Own funds/Total assets 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.093***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Treated*Post*Liquidity ratio -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Treated*Post*ROA 0.042 0.015 0.188
(0.134) (0.129) (0.135)
Treated*Post*NPL ratio -0.002 -0.008 0.076**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.037)
Treated*Post*Loans to households/Total assets 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Treated*Post*Main bank 0.085 0.081 0.080
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056)
Treated*Post*Leader bank in the zip code -0.028 -0.036 -0.047
(0.033) (0.030) (0.033)
Bank*Year:month:day*Fixed/Variable/Mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code*Employment Status*Foreigner Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treated*Post*Loan Characteristics No No No No Yes Yes
Treated*Post*Loan Amount/Mortgage Liabitity No No No No No Yes
Observations 168,250 168,250 168,250 168,250 168,250 168,250
R-squared 0.701 0.704 0.705 0.705 0.706 0.707
TABLE 5 
EFFECT OF THE SHIFT OF STATUTORY INCIDENCE ON MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES: 




































Notes: The table above reports OLS regression results of the effect of the shift of statutory incidence on interest rates of new granted 
mortgages between 2018M1 and 2019M5 on the treatment variable Treated*Post and its interactions. Treated is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one for the primary residence mortgage loans granted in any Spanish provinces but those granted in Basque Country, and zero 
otherwise. Post is a dummy variable that takes one for all the periods after 8 November 2018, and zero otherwise. Coefficients are listed in 
the first row, robust standard errors are reported in the row below which are corrected for clustering at the bank, time and zip code level, and 
the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included, 
"No" that is not included and "-" that is comprised by the included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 













Log(Gross income) -0.255*** -0.050***
(0.038) (0.038)
Treated*Log(Gross income) -0.093 -0.018
(0.090) (0.020)
Post*Log(Gross income) -0.006 -0.012
(0.035) (0.011)
Treated*Post*Log(Gross income) -0.263** 0.015
(0.100) (0.030)
Log(1+No.of banking relationships) 0.094*** 0.036***
(0.019) (0.009)
Treated*Log(1+No.of banking relationships) -0.010 0.007
(0.029) (0.009)
Post*Log(1+No.of banking relationships) -0.047** -0.002
(0.018) (0.003)
Treated*Post*Log(1+No.of banking relationships) -0.089** 0.034*
(0.043) (0.018)
Bank*Year:month:day*Fixed/Variable/Mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Province Fixed Effects*Employment Status*Foreigner Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes
Treated*Post*Loan Characteristics Yes Yes




TABLE 6, PANEL A 
STATUTORY INCIDENCE ON INTEREST RATES:  



























Notes: The table above reports OLS regression results of the effect of the shift of statutory incidence on interest rates of new granted 
mortgages between 2018M1 and 2019M5 (column (1)) and future defaults (column (2)), on the treatment variable Treated*Post. Mortgage 
defaults include loan delinquencies up to 2020Q2 but also borrowers that ask for a loan moratorium during the Covid-19 crisis. Treated is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one for the primary residence mortgage loans granted in any Spanish provinces but those granted in 
Basque Country, and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable that takes one for all the periods after 8 November 2018, and zero otherwise. 
Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors are reported in the row below which are corrected for clustering at the bank, 
time and zip code level, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or 
fixed effects is included, "No" that is not included and "-" that is comprised by the included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 









Treated*Post*Log(Gross income) -0.222** -0.216*
(0.111) (0.112)
Treated*Post*Public servant 0.015 0.017
(0.069) (0.070)










Treated*Post*Log(1+No. of banks in the zip code) -0.033* -0.033*
(0.020) (0.020)
Treated*Post*Log(1+No.of banking relationships) -0.105** -0.104**
(0.043) (0.043)
Bank Characteristics
Treated*Post*Log(Total assets) -0.091** -0.093**
(0.035) (0.035)
Treated*Post*Own funds/Total assets 0.095*** 0.096***
(0.011) (0.011)




Treated*Post*NPL ratio 0.068* 0.068*
(0.035) (0.035)
Treated*Post*Loans to households/Total assets 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
Treated*Post*Main bank 0.079 0.080
(0.057) (0.057)
Treated*Post*Leader bank in the zip code -0.054* -0.055*
(0.032) (0.032)
Bank*Year:month:day*Fixed/Variable/Mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Zip Code*Employment Status*Foreigner Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes
Treated*Post*Loan Characteristics Yes Yes







TABLE 6, PANEL B 

































Notes: The table above reports OLS regression results of the effect of the shift of statutory incidence on simulated and observed interest rates 
of new granted mortgages between 2018M1 and 2019M5 on the treatment variable Treated*Post and its interactions. Simulated interest rates 
are computed for all mortgages before 8 November 2018. Simulated rates are obtained by assuming a discount rate equal to the average yield 
of the Spanish interest bond (1.33) for column (1), and equal to the observed interest rate for column (2). For mortgages after 8 November 
2018 we use the observed interest rates. Treated is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the primary residence mortgage loans 
granted in any Spanish provinces but those granted in Basque Country, and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable that takes one for all 
the periods after 8 November 2018, and zero otherwise. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors are reported in the row 
below which are corrected for clustering at the bank, time and zip code level, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent 
column. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included, "No" that is not included and "-" that is comprised by the 
included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Treated*Post 0.010 -0.012 -0.003 -0.014 0.092* -0.005
(0.013) (0.028) (0.004) (0.011) (0.048) (0.007)
Bank*Year:month:day*Fixed/Variable/Mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code*Employment Status*Foreigner Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code Fixed Effects - Yes - - - -
Year:month Fixed Effects - Yes - - - -
Observations 168,250 39,839 168,250 168,250 168,250 168,250
R-squared 0.728 0.891 0.367 0.631 0.862 0.197
Loan Amount
TABLE 7 
EFFECT OF THE SHIFT OF STATUTORY INCIDENCE ON OTHER LOAN TERMS:  









Notes: The table above reports OLS (for columns (4) to (6)) and Poisson regression (for columns (1) to (3)) and results of the effect of the shift of statutory incidence on other loan terms of new granted 
mortgages between 2018M1 and 2019M5 on the treatment variable Treated*Post. Treated is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the primary residence mortgage loans granted in any Spanish 
provinces but those granted in Basque Country, and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable that takes one for all the periods after 8 November 2018, and zero otherwise. Columns (1) uses as dependent 
variable the loan amount in euros. Columns (3) uses as dependent variable the maturity is months. Columns (4) uses as dependent variable the log of the loan to value ratio. Columns (5) uses as dependent 
variable the logit transformation of the ratio of loan amount over mortgage liability. Columns (6) uses as dependent variable future defaults, which include loan delinquencies up to 2020Q2 but also borrowers 
that ask for a loan moratorium during the Covid-19 crisisCoefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors are reported in the row below which are corrected for clustering at the bank, time and zip 
code level, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included, "No" that is not included and "-" that is comprised by 
the included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 






 Interest Income 
Loans/Total Assets  Loan Fees/Total Assets ROA
High Exposure to Mortgages outside Basque Country*Post 0.054* 0.001 -0.093**
(0.028) (0.006) (0.046)
Year:quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 390 390 390
R-squared 0.973 0.35 0.693
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: 
High Exposure to Mortgages outside Basque Country*Post 0.113* 0.174*** 0.125** 0.174*** 0.019* 0.016**
(0.064) (0.052) (0.063) (0.060) (0.011) (0.008)
High Exposure to Mortgages outside Basque Country*Post*Bank NPL ratio 0.042* 0.105** 0.005
(0.025) (0.040) (0.004)
Borrower Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year:month:day*Fixed/Variable/Mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Zip Code*Employment Status*Foreigner Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
Province Fixed Effects*Application Year:month:day No No No No Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
Observations 168,250 168,250 168,250 168,250 889,366 889,366
R-squared 0.496 0.497 0.824 0.831 0.731 0.732
Interest Rate Loan Amount/Mortgage Liability Loan Application Granted
Consumer LoansMortgages
TABLE 8 
BANK-LEVEL EX-ANTE DIFFERENTIAL EXPOSURE TO THE SHIFT OF STATUTORY INCIDENCE: EX-ANTE CLASSIFICATION OF BANKS  


















Notes: Panel A above reports OLS regression results of the shift of statutory incidence on new mortgages and consumer loans applications between 2018M1 and 2019M5 on the treatment variable High Exposure to Mortgages outside Basque Country*Post. High Exposure to 
Mortgages outside Basque Country is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the ratio of mortgages loans over total assets of the bank before the change in the regulation (December 2017) is above its median value (i.e., an ex-ante variable), and zero otherwise. Post is a 
dummy variable that takes one for all the periods after 8 November 2018, and zero otherwise. Bank NPL is the non-performing loan ratio of the bank at 2017M12. For Panel A, columns (1) and (2) use as dependent variable the interest rate, and columns (3) and (4) the logit 
transformation of the ratio of loan amount over mortgage liability. Panel B reports OLS regressions results at the bank level between 2018Q1 and 2019Q2. For Panel B, column (1) uses as dependent variable interest income of loans over total assets of the bank, column (2) the 
loan fees over total assets, and column (3) the ROA of the bank. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors are reported in the row below which are corrected for clustering at the bank, time and zip code level (for Panel A) and at the bank level (for Panel B), and 
the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included, "No" that is not included and "-" that is comprised by the included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 




Dependent Variable: Loan amount/Mortgage liability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated*Post 0.106** 0.104** 0.095*** 0.099*** 0.119**
(0.051) (0.049) (0.034) (0.035) (0.047)
Household Characteristics
Treated*Post*Log(Gross income) -0.195* -0.191* -0.212* -0.164 -0.111
(0.109) (0.108) (0.122) (0.127) (0.101)
Treated*Post*Public servant -0.038 -0.033 -0.001 0.004
(0.059) (0.055) (0.051) (0.049)
Treated*Post*Banking group employee 0.043 0.046 0.046 0.072*
(0.044) (0.037) (0.043) (0.039)
Treated*Post*Student 0.039 0.044 0.043 0.044
(0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046)
Treated*Post*Unemployed or homemaker -0.040 -0.062 -0.078 -0.084
(0.055) (0.046) (0.060) (0.062)
Treated*Post*Log(Age) -0.064 -0.003 -0.009
(0.064) (0.045) (0.040)
Treated*Post*Log(LTV) -0.095 -0.014 0.008
(0.089) (0.059) (0.067)
Treated*Post*Log(1+No. of banks in the zip code) -0.001 0.002
(0.022) (0.021)
Treated*Post*Log(No.of banking relationships) -0.009 0.001
(0.027) (0.030)
Bank Characteristics
Treated*Post*Log(Total assets) -0.026 -0.040
(0.028) (0.027)
Treated*Post*Own funds/Total assets 0.008 0.013
(0.015) (0.015)




Treated*Post*NPL ratio 0.070*** 0.072***
(0.024) (0.025)
Treated*Post*Loans to households/Total assets 0.003 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Treated*Post*Main bank 0.012 0.015
(0.018) (0.020)
Treated*Post*Leader bank in the zip code 0.027 0.024
(0.030) (0.028)
Bank*Year:month:day*Fixed/Variable/Mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code*Employment Status*Foreigner Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treated*Post*Loan Characteristics & Interest Rate No No No No Yes
Observations 168,250 168,250 168,250 168,250 168,250
R-squared 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.862 0.863
TABLE 9 

































Notes: The table above reports OLS regression results of the logit transformation of the effect of the shift of statutory incidence on the rate of 
the loan amount over mortgage liability of new granted mortgages between 2018M1 and 2019M5 on the treatment variable Treated*Post and 
its interactions. Treated is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the primary residence mortgage loans granted in any Spanish 
provinces but those granted in Basque Country, and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable that takes one for all the periods after 8 
November 2018, and zero otherwise. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors are reported in the row below which are 
corrected for clustering at the bank, time and zip code level, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" 
indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects is included, "No" that is not included and "-" that is comprised by the included set of 
fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 












Treated*Post 0.023** 0.095** 0.042 0.011 -0.002 0.007**
(0.011) (0.044) (0.050) (0.022) (0.003) (0.003)
Borrower Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No No No
Bank Fixed Effects - Yes - - -
Year:month:day Fixed Effects - Yes - - -
Bank*Year:month:day Fixed Effects Yes No - - - -
Bank*Year:month:day*Fixed/Variable/Mixed Interest Rate Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code*Employment Status*Foreigner Fixed Effects - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code*Bank  Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan Characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics - - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 889,366 4,587 1,760,791 1,760,791 1,760,791 1,760,791
R-squared 0.731 0.748 0.495 0.598 0.348 0.187





















Notes: The table above reports regression results of the shift of statutory incidence on consumer loans. In column (1) and (2) the dependent 
variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if at least a loan application is granted for the borrower in the following three months given the 
loan application, and 0 otherwise. Column (2) is similar to column (1) but for the zip codes adjoining to the border of the non-treated 
provinces. Column (3) analyzes the interest rates of new granted consumer loans, column (4) the loan amount in euros, column (5) the 
maturity in months and column (6) the future default of the consumer loans granted. Columns (4) and (5) estimates a Poisson model while an 
OLS model is used in the other cases. The time period is 2018M1-2019M5. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors are 
reported in the row below which are corrected for clustering at the bank, time and zip code level for all columns but (1), where borrower 
level is added. The corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. "Yes" indicates that the set of characteristics or fixed effects 
is included, "No" that is not included and "-" that is comprised by the included set of fixed effects. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 
5%, * significant at 10%. 





























































































Non-treated Treated Euribor (RHS)  
Notes: The table above reports the average of the interest rates of new granted mortgages between 2018M1and 2019M5. Treated is the group of 
primary residence mortgage loans granted in any Spanish provinces but those loans granted in the provinces of the Basque Country. Base reference 
January 2018=100. 














































































Notes: The table above reports the time-varying coefficients of OLS regression results using the specification of Table 2, column 
(8), of the interest rates of new granted primary residence mortgage loans between 2018M1 and 2019M5 on the variable 
Treated*Time dummies. Treated is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the primary residence mortgage loans granted 
in any Spanish provinces but those loans granted in the provinces of the Basque Country, and zero otherwise. Confidence bands are 
at 90%. 
 





EFFECT OF THE SHIFT OF STATUTORY INCIDENCE ON THE RATIO OF LOAN AMOUNT OVER 










































































Notes: The table above reports the time-varying coefficients of OLS regression results using the specification of Table 7, column (4), where the 
dependent variable is the logit transformation of the rate of the loan amount over mortgage liability of new granted mortgages between 2018M1 
and 2019M5 on the variable Treated*Time dummies. Treated is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the primary residence mortgage 
loans granted in any Spanish provinces but those loans granted in the provinces of the Basque Country, and zero otherwise. Confidence bands are 
at 90%.  






Mean Mean test Mean Mean test
Household Characteristics
Log(Gross income) 10.42 1 10.28 c2 -0.63 10.37 1 10.34 c2 -0.20
Public servant 0.05 0.08 c3 0.10 0.03 0.06 c3 0.11
Banking group employee 0.04 0.01 c5 -0.12 0.02 0.00 c5 -0.11
Student 0.02 0.03 c6 0.05 0.01 0.02 c6 0.02
Unemployed or homemaker 0.01 0.02 c8 0.04 0.01 0.02 c8 0.08
Log(Age) 6.15 6.15 c9 0.00 6.15 6.12 c9 -0.09
Log(LTV) 4.05 4.12 c10 0.12 4.10 4.16 c10 0.12
Log(1+No. of banks in the zip code) 1.92 1.90 c12 -0.02 1.65 2.00 c12 0.32
Indebted 0.45 0.46 c13 0.01 0.52 0.43 c13 -0.12
Log(1+No.of banking relationships) 0.32 0.33 c14 0.02 0.36 0.31 c14 -0.10
Bank Characteristics
Log(Total assets) 17.87 18.67 c15 7.17 17.93 18.47 c15 0.25
Own funds/Total assets 7.98 8.52 c16 -1.67 8.07 8.04 c16 -0.01
Liquidity ratio 13.39 15.30 c17 0.14 12.87 11.41 c17 -0.19
ROA 0.54 0.37 c18 -0.33 0.55 0.52 c18 -0.10
NPL ratio 5.67 6.65 c19 0.34 5.59 5.93 c19 0.11
Loans to households/Total assets 31.93 25.69 c20 -0.50 32.67 29.25 c20 -0.27
Main bank 0.18 0.16 -0.04 0.22 0.16 # -0.11
Leader bank in the zip code 0.15 0.25 0.17 0.22 0.29 # 0.11
Loan Characteristics
Log(Loan amount) 11.68 11.45 -0.27 11.59 11.32 # -0.36
Log(Loan maturity) 5.72 5.65 -0.15 5.71 5.64 # -0.19
Interest rate 1.57 2.10 0.41 1.73 1.93 # 0.20
No. of Observations 9,703 158,547 477 6441 0 1 0
Treated=0 Treated=1 Treated=0 Treated=1
Normalized
 Differences
Adjoining Zip CodesAll sample
TABLE A1  
















Notes: This table reports means of a set of variables of the new mortgages granted between 2018M1 and 2019M5. Mortgages are classified depending on the Treated dummy, which is variable that takes the value of one 
for the primary residence mortgage loans granted in any Spanish provinces but those loans granted in the provinces of the Basque Country, and zero otherwise. Columns (3) and (6) report the normalized difference test 
proposed by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), for which Imbens and Rubin (2015) suggested a heuristic threshold of 0.25 in absolute value. The normalized difference statistic tests the null of no differences in means 
between treated and control group through a scale-and-sample-size-free estimator.  




Mean S.D. Mean S.D. test
Household Characteristics
Log(Gross income) 10.29 (0.19) 1 10.29 (0.19) c2 -0.02
Public servant 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27) c3 0.01
Banking group employee 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12) c5 0.00
Student 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.17) c6 0.01
Unemployed or homemaker 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) c8 0.01
Log(Age) 6.15 (0.24) 6.16 (0.24) c9 0.02
Log(LTV) 4.13 (0.43) 4.11 (0.46) c10 -0.04
Log(1+No. of banks in the zip code) 1.93 (0.60) 1.87 (0.58) c12 -0.07
Indebted 0.45 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) c13 0.03
Log(No.of banking relationships) 0.32 (0.39) 0.34 (0.40) c14 0.03
Bank Characteristics
Log(Total assets) 18.74 (1.44) 18.48 (1.56) c15 -0.12
Own funds/Total assets 8.64 (2.93) 8.30 (2.81) c16 -0.08
Liquidity ratio 15.18 (10.35) 15.21 (12.37)c17 0.00
ROA 0.40 (0.40) 0.36 (0.47) c18 -0.06
NPL ratio 6.66 (1.66) 6.51 (1.83) c19 -0.06
Loans to households/Total assets 25.74 (8.40) 26.45 (8.30) c20 0.06
Main bank 0.16 (0.37) 0.15 (0.36) -0.02
Leader bank in the zip code 0.26 (0.44) 0.22 (0.42) -0.05
Loan Characteristics
Log(Loan amount) 11.47 (0.65) 11.46 (0.67) 0.00
Log(Loan maturity) 5.66 (0.32) 5.66 (0.34) 0.00
Interest rate 1.97 (0.89) 2.20 (1.09) 0.16







TABLE A2  
















Notes: This table reports means of a set of variables of the new mortgages granted between 2018M1 and 2019M5. Mortgages are classified 
depending on the Post dummy, which is a variable that takes one for all the periods after 8 November 2018, and zero otherwise. Column (5) 
reports the normalized difference test proposed by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), for which Imbens and Rubin (2015) suggested a heuristic 
threshold of 0.25 in absolute value. The normalized difference statistic tests the null of no differences in means between treated and control 
group through a scale-and-sample-size-free estimator. 



















Notes: This table reports the base tax rate for primary residence mortgages in each of the Spanish regions (Autonomous 
Communities and Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla). 
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